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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The use of foreign law in American constitutional adjudication 
has come to the fore in several recent Supreme Court cases.1  
Among the most controversial of these cases is Lawrence v. Texas.2  
Lawrence, which struck down Texas’ sodomy law, relied heavily on 
foreign legislative and judicial decisions in its eloquent defense of 
same-sex intimacy as a species of liberty.3  Its tone and use of 
foreign law has captured the imagination of gay rights advocates 
self-consciously globalizing their fight for greater freedom and 
equality.4  Those very same characteristics have alarmed opponents 
of constitutional gay rights claims, who see in Lawrence both an 
attack on traditional American cultural values and an abdication of 
American constitutionalism in favor of a vaguely 
elitist/European/supranational tyranny.5 
Still, the notoriety of Lawrence’s use of foreign law might seem 
perplexing, given that the Supreme Court has been using foreign 
law and citing foreign nations’ judicial opinions for a long time.6  
Thus, an article considering the use of foreign and international 
law in gay rights litigation might do well to start by examining the 
 
 1. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997). 
 2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-76 (citing Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, c.60, § 1 
(Eng.); P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Modinos v. Cyprus, 
259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988); Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)). 
 4. The movement for equal marriage rights for same-sex couples is 
especially pertinent here in the United States, as marriage-rights advocates have 
consistently celebrated foreign judicial and legislative decisions to allow same-sex 
marriage.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  But the globalized push for 
gay rights extends beyond marriage to include family protections more generally, 
protection for intimate conduct, coverage in employment discrimination laws, and 
the right to serve in militaries. 
 5. See, e.g., Greg Franke, Renegade Judges Undermine Constitution, HUMAN 
EVENTS, Sept. 13, 2004 (reviewing PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, SUPREMACISTS: THE TYRANNY 
OF JUDGES AND HOW TO STOP IT (2004) and citing, among other troubling 
constitutional trends, “one world globalism”), 
http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=5066. 
 6. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (2005) (citing examples of the 
Supreme Court citing foreign legal authority when determining the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); see also 
Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151. 
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reasons for the strong reaction to Lawrence’s use of foreign law.7  
Lawrence was a controversial opinion, both in the result it reached 
and in the means it used.  It dealt with a question implicating one 
of the main battlegrounds in the current culture wars.  The 
opinion itself was aggressive, in that it explicitly went out of its way 
to rely on a broader and more value-laden grounding—substantive 
due process, rather than equal protection8—to reach its result, 
even though that meant overruling a relatively recent precedent.9  
At the same time, Lawrence is remarkably vague.  Most readers are 
by now familiar with opacity of its legal analysis.  Notwithstanding 
Justice Kennedy’s lyricism about the content of due process liberty 
and his deep understanding of what it means to gay men and 
lesbians to have their sexual intimacy criminalized,10 Lawrence 
remains an enigma in terms of the legal rule it lays down. 
These characteristics might lead critics to look especially 
askance at Lawrence’s invocation of foreign law.  An aggressive, 
vaguely reasoned but highly value-laden opinion on a controversial 
subject implicating culture and morality only becomes more 
problematic, the thought might go, when it does not even rely on 
domestic legal sources to determine the meaning of the governing 
law.11  Opponents of gay rights might be especially alarmed when 
that foreign law—whether it serves as legal precedent or merely a 
model for policy—pushes American law beyond where it would 
otherwise go. 
Beyond these characteristics, the subtext of a globalized gay 
rights movement surely affected the reaction to Lawrence’s use of 
foreign law.  Given the steadily increasing momentum behind gay 
rights in foreign nations,12 opponents of that movement in the 
United States must be alarmed by the Court’s embrace of rights-
 
 7. See discussion infra notes 8-36 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75. 
 9. Perhaps to add insult to injury, Lawrence was written by one of the authors 
of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
which is perhaps most notable for its homage to stare decisis.  See 505 U.S. 833, 
854-69 (1992) (arguing that stare decisis required a refusal to overturn Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596-97. 
 11. Of course, in Lawrence Justice Kennedy was careful to explain how Bowers 
v. Hardwick had been wrong on its own terms, given its narrow conceptualization 
of the right at issue and its misreading of American history, and had also been 
undermined by subsequent domestic precedent.  See id. at 566-77 (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 12. See infra notes 252, 254, and 260 and accompanying text. 
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protective foreign law partly because that embrace legitimizes 
recourse to foreign nations’ gay rights policies.  If Lawrence used 
foreign law to find a constitutional right to same-sex intimacy, the 
argument might go, then perhaps that same Court, or Congress, or 
the states, will look to foreign statutes and judicial decisions when 
deciding whether to recognize other rights, including rights to 
marry, to serve in the military, to be free of employment 
discrimination, or to adopt or retain parental custody. 
This cursory introduction to the issue highlights several factors 
that should be considered when determining the appropriateness 
of borrowing foreign law in American constitutional litigation.  
First is the nature of the constitutional claim.13  Lawrence was a case 
about individual rights.  Indeed, it is the very paradigm of such a 
case, as individuals sought to obtain constitutional protection from 
the State entering their home and branding them criminals based 
on their performance of the most intimate of conduct.14  The 
universality of the individual freedom that Justice Kennedy 
identified in Lawrence15 seems at first glance clearly relevant to the 
question whether foreign law should play a role in adjudicating 
that claim.  Therefore, one factor to consider when determining 
the appropriateness of foreign law borrowing in a case such as 
Lawrence is whether the individual-rights nature of the issue 
universalizes the issue, making foreign law an appropriate source of 
meaning when interpreting the Constitution. 
But the simple fact that a constitutional provision is amenable 
to foreign borrowing does not make the affirmative argument in 
favor of such borrowing.  Indeed, as suggested by the response to 
the court’s use of foreign law in cases such as Lawrence and Roper, 
such borrowing remains controversial among judges,16 scholars,17 
and more general commentators.18  It may be, though, that foreign 
law can play a role more modest than actually supplying or even 
influencing the rule of decision in American constitutional cases.  
In particular, foreign law can provide empirical evidence relevant 
to American constitutional analysis or provide decisional aids that 
 
 13. See infra Parts III.A-B. 
 14. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-63. 
 15. See id. at 562. 
 16. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. See, e.g., John McGinnis, The Limits of International Law in Protecting Dignity, 
27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137 (2003). 
 18. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June 
2005, available at http://www.policyreview.org/jun05/anderson.html. 
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help American courts approximate the rule required by the 
Constitution. 
As the author has argued elsewhere, American courts 
adjudicating constitutional claims often find it quite difficult to 
discern what the Constitution would actually require in a particular 
case.19  Most notably, courts’ decisions to apply rational basis review 
in most equal protection cases reflects an acknowledgement of 
their inability to discern precisely when government action fails the 
constitutional requirement that government classify only in pursuit 
of the public interest.  In such cases, sub-constitutional decisional 
aids, such as estimations of a party’s ability to influence the political 
process, assist courts in reaching results that approximate the 
constitutional rule.20  Foreign law, by providing examples of other 
legal systems’ conclusions about similar issues, may well provide yet 
another decisional aid assisting American courts attempting to 
apply the American constitutional rule.  Under this theory, foreign 
law does not influence the actual meaning of the American 
constitutional provision, but rather assists courts in their search for 
the unique meaning of that provision. 
Foreign law may play a more fundamental role in 
constitutional adjudication.21  If the given constitutional right can 
be understood as incorporating a universal norm, then foreign law 
could well play a role in informing the actual meaning of the 
constitutional provision, rather than simply serving as a decisional 
aid that occupies only sub-constitutional status.  Lawrence stands as a 
prime example of just such a possibility.  Even more than in a case 
such as Roper v. Simmons,22 which simply used foreign law as 
“confirmatory” of the court’s independent analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment,23 Justice Kennedy in Lawrence relied heavily on how 
foreign courts and legislatures had treated sexual intimacy.24  In 
conjunction with this reliance on foreign law, Justice Kennedy 
defined the right at issue in Lawrence as one involving “liberty,” 
rather than the more standard doctrinal approach of asking 
whether the interest at stake was a fundamental “privacy” interest.25  
 
 19. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of 
Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 528-42 (2005). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 22. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 23. See id. at 1198. 
 24. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-78 (2003). 
 25. Id. at 564-65. 
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This doctrinal shift matters for our purposes because it opens the 
door to a much broader use of foreign law in defining the content 
of substantive due process, given the global meaningfulness of 
liberty, in contrast to the relatively more parochial significance of 
privacy, as that term is understood in American constitutional 
doctrine. 
This Article examines these three issues about the borrowing 
of foreign and international law to adjudicate claims under the 
Constitution.  First, it examines whether a meaningful distinction 
can be drawn between structural provisions and individual-rights 
provisions.26  It has been argued that structural provisions are the 
unique result of particular historical, political and social 
conditions, and thus unamenable to interpretation based on 
analogous provisions in foreign law.27  By contrast, as suggested 
above, individual-rights claims might be thought of as more 
inherently universal.28  The first part of the Article considers 
whether structural provisions can be distinguished in such a way.29  
It suggests that they cannot.30 
The Article then moves on to consider individual rights 
claims.31 It considers the usefulness of foreign law as a decisional 
aid to American courts attempting to approximate the rule 
established in the Constitution.32  Foreign law can provide 
empirical evidence of the sort relevant to the application of the 
constitutional rule.  For example, it can provide evidence of the 
weightiness of a state’s interests in impairing a constitutional value 
and the public need for such an impairment.  It can also provide 
part of the social context against which American courts make 
decisions about the fairness of a given classification or the respect 
to be accorded particular private conduct.33 
The Article then examines whether foreign law can play more 
than merely a supporting role in constitutional adjudication.34  
Moving from equal protection, which provides the examples for 
much of the preceding analysis, the Article considers substantive 
 
 26. See infra Parts II-III. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See infra Part III.A. 
 33. See infra Parts III.B.1-2. 
 34. See infra Parts III.B-C. 
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due process, and in particular, Justice Kennedy’s understanding of 
substantive due process in Lawrence.35  It suggests that Justice 
Kennedy’s understanding of substantive due process may effectively 
have globalized that provision into a general guarantee of liberty.36  
If this is true, then foreign law could become substantially more 
relevant to constitutional adjudication than it has been in the past.  
In particular, it could be highly relevant to gay rights claims in 
areas ranging from marriage and parenthood discrimination to 
military service. 
The Article then considers the possible uses of international, 
as opposed to foreign, law.37  Following the basic analytical method 
applied earlier to foreign law, it first considers whether treaty 
norms ratified by the Senate can serve not simply as law themselves, 
but as inputs into judicial analysis of domestic constitutional 
provisions.38  Because the U.S. Senate has added non-self-executing 
statements to its ratification of many human rights treaties, it may 
be important to find such a use for such treaty norms in order for 
treaty law to play a role in protecting Americans’ human rights.39  
Under Lawrence’s analysis of substantive due process, such norms 
can in fact play a useful role in domestic constitutional doctrine, by 
reflecting social and moral judgments about the value to be 
accorded such conduct. 
The Article then moves to non-controlling international law, 
such as treaties to which the United States is not a party and 
customary international law to which the United States has 
objected persistently enough to gain an exemption.40  In Roper v. 
Simmons the Court arguably used both of these sorts of law to 
“confirm” its conclusion that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
the execution of inmates who were juveniles when they committed 
their crimes.41  The Article examines the Court’s analysis in Roper to 
determine how Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in particular is 
amenable to such legal sources.42  It argues that Eighth 
Amendment doctrine’s focus on offender culpability and social 
consensus render it amenable to foreign and international law 
 
 35. See infra Parts III.C.1-2. 
 36. See infra Parts III.C.1-2. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See infra Part IV.A. 
 39. See infra Part IV.A. 
 40. See infra Part IV.B. 
 41. See 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005). 
 42. See infra Part IV.B. 
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conclusions regarding the appropriateness of particular types of 
punishments for particular classes of offenders. 
The Article then considers whether similar analysis would 
apply to due process and equal protection claims.43  It argues that 
the foundation of these rights in social judgments and the 
globalization of those judgments deriving from the rise of 
transnational social institutions renders these claims equally 
amenable to influence from international and transnational 
sources.  While the current state of those social judgments is not 
uniformly favorable to gay rights claims, the increased favor with 
which global society views those claims makes international law 
borrowing more attractive to gay rights litigators, in addition to 
more doctrinally justifiable. 
Throughout, this Article attempts to fit foreign and 
international law within the framework of domestic constitutional 
doctrine, rather than simply overlaying it without any nuance.  
With the Court more accepting of the idea of foreign and 
international law borrowing, the need for such a nuanced, 
contextualized approach to the question becomes correspondingly 
more pressing. 
II.  ARE STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS UNIQUELY RESISTANT TO FOREIGN 
BORROWING? 
Structural provisions are marked by several characteristics.  
Most notably, such provisions are not adopted because of any 
intrinsic worth they possess.  They are instrumental, at least in 
liberal societies based on popular sovereignty and organized for the 
benefit of citizens rather than the state itself. 
 This characteristic of structural arrangements has 
indeterminate consequences for the appropriateness of borrowing 
foreign law.  On the one hand, because such arrangements are 
justified not by their intrinsic worth but instead by their success in 
accomplishing some other goal, the experience of other nations 
would seem quite relevant in determining the appropriate 
arrangements for American government.  Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Printz v. United States reflects this attitude.44  In his opinion, Justice 
Breyer examined other nations’ federal structures in the course of 
determining whether the federal government could 
 
 43. See infra Part IV.D. 
 44. 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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constitutionally command state institutions to enforce federal law.45  
In Justice Breyer’s view, the instrumental nature of federalism 
counseled in favor of examining other nations’ experiences to 
determine whether particular arrangements promote or inhibit the 
underlying goal the structural provision seeks to achieve.46  
Examining the structures of other federal nations, Justice Breyer 
noted that many were able to maintain vibrant federal systems even 
when the central government was able to issue mandates of the sort 
at issue in that case.47 
The opposing view is reflected in Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Printz.  Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Breyer’s 
invocation of other nations’ federal structures.48  He observed that 
the structure of American government was simply different than 
that of other nations.49  Thus, he concluded that while comparative 
study might be highly relevant to constitution drafting, it was 
irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.50 
Justice Scalia’s remark illustrates the argument that choices 
about governmental structure are exactly that—choices—rather 
than normatively transcendent principles or empirically testable 
propositions for which recourse to foreign law might be 
appropriate.  In Justice Scalia’s view, structural provisions are 
arbitrary, in the sense that they reflect the drafters’ decisions that 
certain structures were best suited to achieving the goals they 
sought to achieve.51  Other nations’ constitution-makers might well 
make different choices.52  While the choices of foreign 
constitution-makers might be useful as examples of structures that 
should be embraced— “constitution drafting” —they are irrelevant 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. (examining foreign precedent to determine whether the 
commandeering of state governments attempted by the challenged federal law was 
the best balance of the need for a central government and the liberty promoted by 
local control). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 921 n.11. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 919-22. 
 52. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[M]any countries of the world get along with an executive that is 
much weaker than ours—in fact, entirely dependent on the continued support of 
the legislature.”); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (noting that 
more expansive legislator standing rules might exist in other nations’ systems, 
even if they do not exist in the American system). 
9
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to understanding the choices that the American Constitution’s 
drafters actually did embrace— “constitutional interpretation.” 
Thus, at first glance, structural provisions, in part because of 
their instrumental nature, may well not be amenable to 
interpretation by reference to other nations’ structural law.  At least 
this would be the case if one believed that structural provisions had 
actual determinate meaning, as opposed to merely standing for a 
broad principle, such as the existence of a vibrant federal system, 
which could be applied by reference to how other legal systems 
deal with the same issue.53  But this first cut is insufficiently precise.  
Why is an instrumental provision necessarily arbitrary, in the sense 
of representing a willful choice rather than an adoption of a rule 
based on reason or universal values?  Professor Vicki Jackson, 
discussing the uses of comparative federalism law, advances the 
discussion by arguing that federalism arrangements are historically 
contingent and (in a non-pejorative way) unprincipled, and thus 
not amenable to illumination by reference to foreign judicial 
analysis.54  She writes that “federalism provisions are often 
peculiarly the product of political compromise in historically 
situated moments, generally designed as a practical rather than a 
principled accommodation of competing interests,” and thus are 
“unique to the parties’ situations.” 55  She continues that federalism 
arrangements are not only a compromise, but also a compromise 
that “typically constitutes an interrelated ‘package’ of 
arrangements.”56  Thus, while the historically contingent nature of 
those provisions makes their proper interpretation resistant to 
foreign law borrowing,57 this “package deal” aspect makes it 
inappropriate to interpret those provisions as isolated principles.58 
The contingent nature of structural provisions arguably 
extends to the identity of the groups constituting the society to be 
governed.  If structural arrangements can be understood as 
agreements setting the rules of the road between the groups 
constituting the society, then the unique combination of groups in 
 
 53. But see Printz, 521 U.S. at 976, 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing Printz as 
posing the “common legal problem” of “reconciling central authority with the need to 
preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent governmental entity”). 
 54. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 247-50 (2001). 
 55. Id. at 273. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 273. 
 58. See id. at 273-74. 
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a given society necessarily means that different arrangements can 
never truly be compared.  Federalism provisions in the Indian 
Constitution—designed largely to accommodate the nation’s 
ethnic and religious diversity—may be incomparable to those in 
the German Basic Law, which were motivated not by such diversity 
but instead by a desire to prevent the totalitarian centralizing of 
power that accompanied Nazism.59  In our own day, we are 
witnessing the creation of a federal structure in Iraq, whose 
provisions most assuredly respond to the unique relationships 
between the ethnic and religious groups struggling for power in 
that nation.60  None of these may be comparable to the provisions 
of American federalism, with its own unique set of historical and 
social circumstances. 
In sum, this argument maintains that both the historical 
contingency of these provisions and their interrelationship to other 
parts of the overall compromise struck when establishing 
constitutional structure tie their meaning closely to purely 
domestic interpretive sources.  Analogous foreign provisions are 
fundamentally different, given that they resulted from different sets 
of pressures and actors. 
However, it is unclear why the characteristics described above 
describe only structural provisions.  For example, the history of the 
Reconstruction Amendments suggests that “political compromises 
in historically situated moments” greatly influenced whether the 
broadly worded guarantees of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendments would encompass the right to vote or “social,” as 
opposed to “civil,” equality.61  The Founders’ compromise with 
slavery also resulted from such a historically situated moment.  
Moreover, the Founders’ compromise constituted a key part of an 
“interrelated ‘package’ of arrangements” that made possible a 
national consensus in favor of ratifying the Constitution itself.62  As 
 
 59. See, e.g., Clifford Larsen, States Federal, Financial, Sovereign and Social: A 
Critical Inquiry into an Alternative to American Financial Federalism, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 
429, 460 (1995) (noting that the Allies’ postwar concern with Nazi centralization 
led them to impose a federal structure on Germany, creating states that for the 
most part had no historical roots). 
 60. See IRAQI CONSTITUTION arts. 109-110 (dealing with allocation of power over 
oil resources); art. 111 (dealing with clashes between local and national law); art. 114 
(dealing with rights of provinces to form larger regions), available at http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/24_08_05_constit.pdf. 
 61. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 273. 
 62. See id. at 273-74. 
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a result of that compromise, however, language in rights provisions 
such as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause had to be 
contorted—that is, read against the context of a uniquely American 
history—in order to accommodate slavery-protective federal laws 
such as the Fugitive Slave Acts, and the permissibility of slavery in 
the District of Columbia.63  These examples illustrate that rights 
provisions, just like structural ones, may well be historically situated 
compromises that make their cross-national comparisons 
inappropriate as well.64 
Even more fundamentally, the very difference between 
structural and rights provisions is hardly watertight.  Rights 
provisions are not simply statements of individual rights as against 
an abstract “government”; instead, they also function as protections 
of minorities against majorities.65  Indeed, Akhil Amar has argued 
that the Bill of Rights was in fact originally intended as structural 
 
 63. See generally JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965). 
 64. Of course, sometimes the historical context of a constitution-drafting 
period is reflected in the actual text of a given provision.  Thus, for example, 
provisions of the German Basic Law explicitly condition grants of individual rights 
on the continued security of the democratic system itself.  See Donald P. Kommers, 
German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837, 854-55 (1991).  This 
provision resulted from the experience the Basic Law’s framers had with the rise 
of Nazism and the Nazis’ use of democratic freedoms to subvert that very system.  
Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and the 
Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE, 301, 302 
(1998).  But in such cases the inappropriateness of foreign borrowing is much 
clearer, and less controversial, given the clear textual commitment to a certain 
choice.  By contrast, provisions such the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
are at least potentially open to borrowing, given their open-ended quality.  E.g., 
Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment 
and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 110 (1983) (“From Lochner to Roe . . . 
the Court clearly has not seen its function in constitutional adjudication to be 
limited to implementing the values constitutionalized by the framers.  The Court 
itself has infused values into the open-ended concepts of due process and equal 
protection.”).  While the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are open-
ended and leave significant room for judicial interpretation, the Clauses and their 
historical context provide no clear basis for using foreign law as an interpretation 
aid.  The question of whether borrowing is an appropriate interpretative tool 
when construing these clauses therefore raises borrowing questions that are more 
difficult to answer than in the context of, for example, the German Basic Law.   
 65. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 964-66 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (finding the legislative veto to be unconstitutional given the 
procedural due process violations inherent in allowing a majoritarian legislature 
to determine when an agency has correctly applied a regulation to an identified 
individual); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding that requirement 
that any city ordinance regulating on basis of race must be first approved by 
majority was unconstitutional). 
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protections for localism against the forces of a centralized 
government.66  Thus, rights provisions can be understood as 
additions to government structure, by denying certain powers to 
majorities, even if today we have come to pigeonhole provisions as 
“structural” or “rights granting.”67 
For these reasons, any possible distinction between structural 
and rights provisions cannot by itself serve as the basis for 
determining the appropriateness of foreign law borrowing, even 
assuming that these two types of provisions can coherently be 
distinguished.  Fundamentally, both structural and rights 
provisions result from particular historical and social 
circumstances; therefore, this characteristic does not support a 
distinction on this issue.  A more supple analysis is required, one 
that examines the particular function which foreign law is being 
offered up to play. 
The next section of the Article considers the particular uses 
foreign law can play in constitutional interpretation.68  It uses rights 
provisions as illustrations, in part because as a practical matter gay 
rights advocates’ constitutional rights claims rest largely (though 
not completely)69 on individual rights provisions, most notably due 
process and equal protection.  In addition, though, rights 
provisions are especially prone to claims that foreign law provides 
insight into their meaning.  Rights provisions are often written in 
language, such as “equal protection” or “liberty” or “freedom of 
speech,” that has come to signify global norms.  A search for the 
meaning of such a provision thus naturally leads to the meaning of 
those global norms. 
In addition, courts’ primary roles as protectors of rights render 
them unable to shy away from construing vaguely worded, open-
 
 66. AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION chs. 1-6 
(1998). 
 67. See generally William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, 
the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory 
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1092-1101 (1999) (discussing the 
individual rights background of separation of powers issues). 
 68. See infra Part III. 
 69. Most notably, the law review literature has abounded with discussions 
about whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause could be used to expand same-sex 
marriage rights from individual states to the entire nation, and, conversely, 
whether Congress appropriately used its power to enforce that clause when it 
sought to prevent such an outcome by enacting the Defense of Marriage Act.  See, 
e.g., Phyllis G. Bossin, Same-Sex Unions: The New Civil Rights Struggle or an Assault on 
Traditional Marriage?, 40 TULSA L. REV. 381, 386 (2005). 
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ended rights provisions; by contrast, they might be more willing 
(and indeed, feel obligated) to demur when confronting 
interbranch or federal-state conflicts.70  The requirement that 
courts adjudicate rights claims, even when they involve 
indeterminate language and a contested drafting history, means 
that they will often search for sub-constitutional rules or decisional 
aids to assist them.  Such rules and aids do not reflect actual 
constitutional meaning, but instead constitute heuristics that help 
the court approximate the actual constitutional rule when it 
decides the case.  Building on his previous work,71 the author 
suggests that foreign law, even if not an appropriate tool in actually 
defining the content of constitutional provisions, can play a very 
useful role in providing aids that assist a court in determining for 
itself the unique meaning of American constitutional provisions. 
III.  INTERPRETING RIGHTS PROVISIONS BASED ON FOREIGN LAW 
The practice of borrowing from foreign (and, indeed, 
international)72 law when interpreting rights provisions requires a 
theory of how such law properly influences the meaning of the 
given provision.73  This is different from the status of international 
law as such as binding on American courts.74  Of course, foreign law 
may influence the development of a customary norm of 
international law, which might then in its own right bind American 
courts.  But this is a different question from whether and how 
foreign law itself should directly influence American law. 
 
 70. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 
(1985) (concluding that federalism-based concerns about the imposition of 
federal regulations on states are best addressed through the political process); 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-99 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(using the political question doctrine to refuse to intervene in a struggle between 
the President and members of the Senate over the Senate’s role in abrogating 
treaty obligations). 
 71. See Araiza, supra note 19; William D. Araiza, Court, Congress, and Equal 
Protection: What Brown Teaches Us About the Section 5 Power, 47 HOWARD L. REV. 199 
(2004). 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. See generally Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional 
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 641 (2005). 
 74. See, e.g., Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law 
in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1992) 
(discussing the acceptance of customary international law as binding in United 
States courts); see also discussion infra Part IV. 
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A.  Foreign Law as a Source of Constitutional Law 
It is necessary to develop a theory of contemporary foreign 
law’s relevance to constitutional interpretation in order to answer 
the contention that the particular rights provision at issue 
represents only a grant of discrete, bounded rights defined by the 
historical circumstances of the drafting and the intentions of the 
drafters and ratifiers.75  Of course, this contention goes beyond 
questioning the practice of foreign law borrowing to challenge any 
interpretive method that seeks to find meaning in a provision 
beyond that clearly intended by its drafters.76  It has been argued, 
for example, that the concerns motivating the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress require that the Equal Protection Clause be understood 
simply as a mandate of racial equality (and indeed, racial equality 
with regard only to a discrete set of rights), rather than as a general 
expression that all persons should in some way be treated 
“equally.”77  Under a strict originalist methodology, it would be 
inappropriate to consider not only contemporary foreign law 
conceptions of what constitutes equal treatment, but even evolving 
domestic understandings of what classifications should be 
disfavored.78 
Broader interpretive philosophies suggest different uses of 
foreign law.  For example, if one believes that a given constitutional 
provision constitutionalizes a less specific, more evolving 
conception of rights, as, for example, the Eighth Amendment is 
currently understood,79 then the question becomes one of 
identifying the relevant community whose evolving opinions count.  
That community could include foreigners, if, for example, the 
provision at issue constitutionalizes a norm that is understood to be 
 
 75. Even an originalist interpretive theory might give effect to foreign law.  
However, that foreign law would be the foreign law existing at the time of the 
drafting, and then, of course, only if the judge was convinced that the drafters 
looked to that foreign law when writing the provision in question.  See Alford, infra 
note 73, at 645-58 (discussing the role foreign law plays in originalist 
interpretation). 
 76. This statement assumes that the drafters themselves intended, or at least 
were not opposed to, an interpretive methodology that focused on their own 
intent.  This assumption is contested.  See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (concluding that the 
framers would have opposed such a methodology). 
 77. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 171 (1977). 
 78. See, e.g., id. 
 79. See infra Part IV.B. 
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global, such as equality or freedom of conscience.80  If the meaning 
of such a norm is developed through the legal process, then it 
might be appropriate to say that that community would consist of 
foreign lawyers and jurists, who develop such norms through their 
work with analogous language within their own legal systems.81 
Thus, unless the provision at issue can be thought of as having 
a built-in reference to evolving foreign law, either in the necessary 
implications of its text82 or the clear intentions of the drafters,83 the 
relevance of such law can only be determined after resolving the 
question of the proper interpretive methodology.  Such a theory 
might, for example, suggest that a court should seek to “translate” 
the drafters’ intentions into contemporary context.84  Alternatively, 
it might call for judges to focus on the bare text of the particular 
provisions, or to current majoritarian understandings of what that 
text should mean,85 without reference to the meaning the drafters 
intended to convey when using that text.  Thus, it might call for 
judges to construe the term “equal protection of the laws” 
according to the court’s best notion about what those words can 
encompass and should normatively mean, rather than what the 
 
 80. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1999, 2021-25 (2003) (discussing how cases of human rights are 
particularly likely to involve sets of universally held values). 
 81. See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better 
Argument, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 450 (2003) (discussing the concept and 
composition of an interpretive community as including those that develop and 
apply the legal norm at issue). 
 82. For example, the provision authorizing Congress to define and punish 
crimes “against the Law of Nations” would seem to incorporate the evolution of 
the law of nations.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  Compare Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004), for a discussion of the Court’s position that 
takes only cautious steps in the judicial definition of offenses against the law of 
nations, in part to avoid intruding on congressional prerogatives to decide issues 
of foreign relations. 
 83. But cf. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28 (attempting to determine whether the 
drafters of the Alien Tort Statute intended to embrace an evolving conception of 
customary international law when authorizing federal courts to hear cases alleging 
violations of the law of nations). 
 84. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 
(1993) (arguing that constitutional notions will change over time as a matter of 
fidelity, which means that they must change in order to stay in accord with the 
Constitution’s original meaning). 
 85. For example, the argument has been made that the people, acting 
through Congress, should have significant discretion in determining the 
appropriate meanings of the various guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See, e.g.¸ Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal 
Antidiscrimination Law After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
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drafters intended to accomplish by writing them.  Alternatively, one 
might embrace a theory in which legislatures have the authority to 
interpret what equal protection of the laws means today.86 
Obviously, such theories are highly controversial.  The 
underlying debates about these interpretive theories are at least as 
contested as the question of foreign law’s appropriate influence on 
constitutional interpretation.  Indeed, most commentators’ and 
judges’ views on foreign-law borrowing probably flow from their 
position on these larger issues of interpretive methodology, rather 
than vice-versa.87  This Article avoids such a grand inquiry into 
methods of constitutional interpretation, which would overwhelm 
its focus on the appropriateness of foreign-law borrowing.  Instead, 
it examines the possibilities for more modest use of foreign law in 
constitutional adjudication.88 
B.  Foreign Law as an Input into Constitutional Analysis 
A more promising approach to foreign law’s use in 
constitutional interpretation distinguishes between the tasks of 
finding constitutional meaning and applying that meaning to 
decide particular cases.  While it might be difficult to use foreign 
law to influence the abstract meaning of American constitutional 
provisions, it is far more defensible to use foreign law as a 
decisional aid in applying that meaning to particular contexts.  To 
clarify this point, this part of the Article first explains the 
distinction between constitutional law and sub-constitutional 
decisional aids.89  It then examines two ways in which foreign law 
can assist in the application of constitutional law to a given set of 
facts.90 
1.  Interpreting the Constitution and Deciding Cases 
A court’s prime obligation in hearing a case is to rule for one 
side or the other.  While seemingly a truism, this observation 
implies an important point—that a court’s prime function is not to 
 
 86. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (suggesting that 
Congress could determine for itself the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 87. Alford, supra note 73, at 641 (“Comparativism is not a constitutional 
theory; it is a methodology that is employed depending on a judge’s particular 
theory.”). 
 88. See infra Part III.B. 
 89. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 90. See infra Parts III.B.1-2. 
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interpret law.  Of course, a court may have to interpret law in the 
course of deciding which party should prevail, but in such a case 
the task of law interpreting is subsidiary and instrumental, and 
often unnecessary.  For example, courts generally do not pass on 
legal arguments unnecessary to the decision of the case.  Only legal 
conclusions necessary to the decision of the case are considered the 
binding precedent created by that case, while all other legal 
analysis is deemphasized as dicta.91  Decisions that have no impact 
on actual parties are beyond the scope of the federal judicial power 
to decide “cases and controversies.”92 Thus, the legal force of a 
court’s actions on third parties—that is, its authoritative statement 
of law—is inextricably tied to the result of the dispute the court 
adjudicated.93 
Thus, a court’s prime responsibility is to decide the case in 
front of it.  While that responsibility sometimes requires the court 
to interpret law, often a court will confess its inability truly to 
determine what the Constitution requires.  At times this inability 
will lead a court simply to decline to decide a case.94  However, this 
option is usually not available when the question is one of 
individual rights, given courts’ special responsibility to vindicate 
those rights.95  In such situations courts must decide, despite their 
inability to distill from the Constitution a rule precise enough to 
govern particular cases. 
As the author has argued elsewhere, rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause provides a clear example of 
courts deciding cases without authoritatively interpreting the 
 
 91. To continue this point, when the majority of a multi-judge panel agrees 
on a result but disagrees on the rationale, the narrowest rationale taken by a 
member of the majority becomes the holding.  See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
 92. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (holding that a case 
that is mooted is beyond the Court’s Article III judicial power). 
 93. Similarly, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall defended the 
practice of judicial review as incident to a court’s need, as part of deciding a case, 
to determine which law applied when two laws conflicted.  5 U.S. 137, 177-78 
(1803). 
 94. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (citing as one of the 
criteria for calling an issue a non-justiciable political question the lack of judicially-
manageable standards for deciding the case). 
 95. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163-166 (concluding that once a right has 
vested in an individual it falls to the courts to provide a remedy for any violation of 
that right); cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-77 (1992) (holding 
that generalized grievances are beyond the scope of the judicial power, given the 
capacity of the public to vindicate its generalized rights in the political branches). 
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underlying legal principle.96  Briefly, the argument is that 
institutional competence concerns make it impossible for a court 
truly to know what equal protection requires in many situations.  As 
a result, the courts often accord deferential scrutiny to challenged 
classifications, relying on presumptions of constitutionality and 
conclusions about the burdened party’s ability to influence the 
political process to prevent or remedy inappropriate 
classifications.97  The results of such “rational basis” scrutiny—that 
the government almost always wins—should not be understood as 
reflecting the true equal protection requirement.98  Rather, those 
results reflect courts doing their best to identify the constitutional 
law applicable to a case through the use of presumptions, 
estimations of political strength, and other sub-constitutional, but 
judicially manageable, rules of thumb. 
2.  Foreign Law as an Input in Deciding Cases: The Example of 
Equal Protection 
Foreign law can provide similar decisional aids in 
constitutional cases.  On this theory, traditional domestic sources of 
the meaning of provisions such as equal protection or substantive 
due process often don’t provide precise answers to questions courts 
must answer.  Foreign law can assist in the process of applying such 
vague constitutional rules, even if it does not play a role in 
uncovering the abstract meaning of those rules. 
An example may clarify this argument.  Consider a claim that 
that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)’s definition99 of 
marriage to exclude same-sex unions violates the equality 
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Our 
intuition might suggest that a court’s evaluation of this claim would 
be assisted by foreign courts’ evaluations of similar claims made 
under equality provisions of those other nations’ constitutions.  But 
how? 
Presumably the first doctrinal question would be whether the 
Equal Protection Clause even addresses the relevant 
discrimination—in this case, discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or with regard to the ability to marry.  Using foreign 
 
 96. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 535-38. 
 97. See id. at 538. 
 98. See id. at 537. 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). 
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law—for example, the scope of other nations’ contemporary 
equality principles—to influence that decision suggests that 
contemporary foreign law can help uncover actual constitutional 
meaning.  Such a use implies an acceptance of particular 
interpretive methodologies, and the rejection of others, most 
notably one based on the intention of the drafters of the text.  
After all, it is questionable whether foreign law equality norms (to 
the extent they even existed in 1866) influenced the drafters, and 
even more questionable whether the drafters directed their gaze 
primarily at such foreign norms, rather than to the pressing 
questions of slavery and racial equality that had ignited the Civil 
War.  Of course, even if all that were true, an originalist 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause would still refuse to resort 
to contemporary foreign law.100 
The fact that using foreign law implies acceptance of one 
interpretive theory and rejection of another does not make such 
use illegitimate.  As argued above, however, the fundamental 
disagreement about interpretive methodologies cautions against 
immediate embrace of a borrowing theory that presupposes a 
choice on this more fundamental question.  A more modest theory 
allows courts to utilize foreign law in developing sub-constitutional 
decisional rules to assist them in deciding constitutional cases.  
Even more modestly, courts could use foreign law to illuminate the 
context surrounding such sub-constitutional rules. 
Equal protection provides a prime example of the role foreign 
law can play.  The historical context of the Equal Protection Clause 
makes it clear that race classifications are almost never appropriate, 
at least when their purpose or effect is to subordinate one race.101  
In that sense, one might say that the rule against race classification, 
 
 100. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 73, at 645-59. 
 101. It becomes difficult at this point to discuss the role historical 
understandings should play in understanding the Fifth Amendment’s equality 
guarantee.  Most of the history generally thought to be relevant derives from the 
Equal Protection Clause, ratified more than seventy years after the Fifth 
Amendment.  Because the Court has concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s 
equality guarantee is co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment’s, (see Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)), and since a robust equality guarantee is generally 
thought to have entered the Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
only then “reverse incorporated” into the Fifth Amendment (see generally 
Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 982-85 (2004) for a 
discussion of the rise of reverse incorporation), it might make sense to focus on 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when discussing the federal 
government’s equality obligations. 
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or perhaps race subordination, is in fact constitutional “law.”102  
However, other classifications—gender, sexual orientation, and 
indeed every classification other than race—do not present 
compelling historical arguments for their prohibition by the 
drafters.  Nevertheless, all of the Justices on the Court have agreed, 
at least in principle, that a valid equal protection claim may be 
made in the absence of a race-based classification.103  As the author 
has argued elsewhere, the equal protection principle is animated 
by a second principle: a rule against arbitrary classifications devoid 
of a genuine public purpose either through utter irrationality104 or 
animus.105 
The rule against purely private-regarding classifications is 
properly considered a rule of constitutional law: it does not derive 
from any more fundamental principle found in equal protection, 
but instead stands for the foundational proposition that in general 
government may not classify simply for the sake of singling out.106  
As a rule of constitutional law, under the theory being sketched out 
here foreign law should play no role in uncovering it. 
However, foreign law can play a significant role in deciding 
cases under that rule.  Deciding whether a particular gender, 
sexual orientation or other non-racial classification satisfies a public 
purpose presents a difficult challenge to courts.  In deciding such 
issues, the Supreme Court has often relied on methodologies that 
reach this question only indirectly, by asking whether the political 
 
 102. For purposes of this Article, it is irrelevant whether race classification in 
general, or race subordination in particular, constitutes this core rule of equal 
protection.  Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring) (reserving this question), with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Equal 
Protection Clause aims at race classification per se). 
 103. See¸ e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).  
In addition to Olech, of course, the Court has found a variety of non-racial 
classification decisions to violate the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (sexual orientation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (mental retardation); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 
55 (1982) (status as recent arrival from out-of-state); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (gender). 
 104. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster County, 
488 U.S. 336 (1989) (striking down a property tax valuation scheme as arbitrary 
and thus in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 105. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 551; see also Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 
448; Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (simple dislike of a group 
an inappropriate ground on which to classify). 
 106. See generally Olech, 528 U.S. 562. 
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situation facing the burdened group is such that arbitrary burdens 
are likely to be caught by the political process.107  When that 
inquiry yields the result that a group is not a suspect class, the court 
then applies a very deferential ends-means scrutiny with a 
presumption of constitutionality.108  As the author has argued 
elsewhere, such deferential review and such a presumption reflect 
institutional competence concerns, rather than an assumption that 
most of those classifications are likely constitutional in some 
abstract sense.109 
a.  Foreign Law as an Empirical Input 
Foreign law can play a helpful role in mitigating that judicial 
incompetence and allowing courts to play a more meaningful role 
in evaluating constitutional gay rights claims.  To the extent that 
foreign law engages the questions of social reality that underlie 
equal protection claims, it can provide useful inputs into an 
analysis that is itself based on American constitutional doctrine.  
Thus, to return to the DOMA example, foreign law could help an 
American court decide empirical questions such as whether same-
sex households provide the same quality of childrearing as other 
households, a factor that would surely go into a court’s analysis of 
DOMA’s restrictions on gay marriage, should those restrictions be 
defended with arguments that gays and lesbians do not provide 
optimal child-rearing environments.110  To take another example, 
foreign law could provide another source of expert opinion about 
the compatibility between homosexuality and military service, and 
thus provide input into an American court’s evaluation of defenses 
to the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. 
Note that the assistance foreign law provides here derives not 
just from foreign judicial decisions but also from foreign law more 
generally.  Thus, a legislature’s decision to allow gay marriage, an 
administrative agency’s decision to allow gays to adopt, or a military 
command’s decision to institute a non-discrimination rule should 
count with American courts considering analogous issues in the 
context of constitutional litigation.  For example, Chief Justice 
 
 107. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 526-27. 
 108. See id. at 535-36. 
 109. See id. at 528-42. 
 110. See, e.g., Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (considering and rejecting claims that concern for 
children’s best interest justifies prohibiting same-sex marriage). 
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Rehnquist’s opinion for the court in Washington v. Glucksberg relied 
in part on a study undertaken by the Dutch government to 
determine the effects of its assisted-suicide law.111  While Glucksberg 
was a substantive due process case, the court used the Dutch study 
to consider the empirical implications of assisted suicide, seeking 
information about the plausibility of government concerns in a way 
relevant both to due process and equal protection analysis.112 
This use of foreign law might seem modest.  It suggests that 
foreign law constitutes nothing more than a respected source of 
information, akin perhaps to a university research study.  But law is 
different.  Because governmental actions carry with them great 
consequences and are presumed to be the actions of that society 
acting as a whole, governmental decisions of the sort described 
above represent more than academic conclusions.  Instead, they 
reflect decisions by a polity, acting through its constituted 
authority, to change the rules under which it exerts its sovereign 
power.  They are law—albeit foreign law—and thus deserve the 
respect of other lawmakers, at least to the extent that the foreign 
lawmakers’ values are generally thought to be similar to our own.113  
Decisions by foreign governments that empirical facts support 
particular outcomes deserve special respect from American courts, 
since they reflect the wielding of the same sovereign power wielded 
by American courts.114 
b.  Foreign Law as Social Context 
There remains the question whether foreign law can do more 
than simply provide empirical support in applying domestically 
derived legal rules.  Again, equal protection provides a useful 
context for this discussion.  As argued above, the difficulty of 
determining when classifications are truly based on public-
regarding purposes renders much equal protection jurisprudence a 
search for judicially manageable indicia of possible animus.115  The 
familiar tiered scrutiny structure, and more generally the degree of 
skepticism with which a court will review a challenged classification, 
 
 111. 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997). 
 112. Id. 
 113. For a discussion of which nations’ laws should be consulted, and on which 
issues, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 114. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (citing the 
decision by the British Parliament to decriminalize same-sex conduct). 
 115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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reflect the Supreme Court’s search for such indicia. 
Beyond serving as empirical support for the application of 
such scrutiny, foreign law may be useful to American courts 
considering the inherent suspectness of a given classification tool.  
If the search for the appropriate scrutiny level is fundamentally a 
search for situations where animus is likely then foreign law may 
help by indicating the likelihood of animus.  This inquiry—halfway 
between the uncovering of the anti-animus rule itself and the 
consideration of empirical evidence in the course of applying the 
appropriate scrutiny level—involves both an inquiry into social facts 
and morality. 
Equal protection analysis cannot avoid moral inquiry.  Even 
John Hart Ely, who provided perhaps the most compelling 
argument for a value-free, process-based understanding of equal 
protection (and constitutional law more generally), had to concede 
the need for value judgments in equal protection when he noted 
that equal protection doctrine amounted to a search for situations 
where minorities were ignored in the political process for reasons 
that were in some sense “discreditable.”116  Standard suspect class 
doctrine makes this clear when it asks, in addition to questions 
about historical oppression and current political powerlessness, 
whether the classification is in some measure unfair or contrary to 
the idea that one should not be burdened for reasons beyond one’s 
control.117  Indeed, even the political 
powerlessness criterion inevitably requires a normative baseline 
 
 116. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
152 (1980). 
 117. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) (relying in part on the immutability of the gender characteristic in 
concluding that gender classifications should be strictly scrutinized); Watkins v. 
U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1438, 1444 (9th Cir. 1988) (summarizing suspect class 
doctrine as including a generalized concern that classifications not reflect “gross 
unfairness that is sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to 
term it invidious”), aff’d on different grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc).  Even this description does not fully explain standard equal protection 
doctrine.  As Ely concedes, being short or blind or having a low I.Q. is beyond 
one’s control, yet height, vision, and intelligence classifications generally raise no 
equal protection problems, largely because we do not view the reasons for such 
classifications as “discreditable.”  See ELY, supra note 116, at 152.  This moral 
understanding may well be evolving, as evidenced by passage of statutes such as 
the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-02, 12111-17, 12131-34, 
12141-50, 12161-65, 12181-89, 12201-13 (2000).  This evolution, however, simply 
underscores the fact that determinations about the appropriateness of 
classifications are inherently based on moral judgments. 
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since most minorities are politically powerless to some degree and 
suffer from at least some lack of attention from decision makers.118 
The normative character of standard equal protection analysis 
thus requires courts considering equality claims to engage both 
with social reality and with society’s understandings of what type of 
discrimination is “arbitrary” or “unfair.”  Foreign law can play a role 
here to the extent that American society’s moral understandings 
are reflected in and influenced by foreign law.  The Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment and substantive due process cases have 
already recognized that foreign law both illuminates and influences 
domestic moral understandings,119 and at least two justices have 
recognized how international law does the same in the equal 
protection context.120  Thus, foreign law can influence American 
equal protection jurisprudence by influencing American 
perceptions of a classification’s arbitrariness, and the moral 
justifiability for a group’s political powerlessness. 
In this way, foreign law does not supply the foundational 
components of American law.  Nor, at the other extreme, does it 
merely supply empirical support for its conclusions.  Instead, under 
this theory foreign law becomes part of the social context that 
informs an American court’s own moral judgments relevant to the 
constitutional issue.  In this sense foreign law is not qualitatively 
different from other symbolic statements made in the public 
square.  Thus, in the gay rights context, foreign legal statements 
play similar roles to corporations’ grants of domestic partner 
benefits, popular culture’s positive portrayal of gays and lesbians, 
or a prominent athlete’s or soldier’s coming out.  All of these 
statements become part of the background of shared—or at least 
widespread—understandings against which courts must make 
moral judgments when deciding a case.121 
 
 118. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 
715 (1985). 
 119. See infra Part III.B. (discussing how foreign law relating to criminal 
punishment illuminates the moral judgments relevant to Eighth Amendment 
issues); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“The right the petitioners seek in this case has 
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.”). 
 120. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring, joined by Breyer, J.) (noting how a proper understanding of the 
moral meaning of race-based affirmative action can be informed by international 
law). 
 121. See Jay Michaelson, Essay, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, Or, How America 
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn’t, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1559, 1567 (2000) (explaining how the evolution of American society undermined 
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Under this theory, it is not foreign law’s uniquely legal status 
that plays this influential role in American law.  Instead, it is foreign 
law’s status as the output of institutions—foreign courts—that are 
respected participants in the public debate about the morality of a 
given government action.  Still, foreign judicial pronouncements 
may well be especially persuasive to American courts, since foreign 
courts are largely answering the same type of question in the same 
general institutional context as their American counterparts.122  
Thus, the reasoned nature of foreign judicial pronouncements, 
their grounding in a fundamental legal mandate, and courts’ 
awareness that they are establishing limits on government action—
rather than mandates for private action—make those 
pronouncements especially significant to an American court 
seeking to understand the social context of an issue it must 
decide.123 
3.  Foreign Law as Law 
Is there, however, a theory under which foreign law’s uniquely 
legal qualities influence American equality law?  Is there something 
about the theory of a foreign nation’s law or the legal reasoning of 
foreign courts that can directly translate into American law?  In the 
case of equal protection, foreign law clearly could inform the 
application of that guarantee, either at the second step of 
determining which classifications run a high risk of being arbitrary 
or the third step of actually applying the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to a given classification.  However, for foreign law to 
influence the first, foundational step of determining what the 
Equal Protection Clause (or any other constitutional rights 
guarantee) actually prohibits, one would have to derive a theory of 
that guarantee in which its meaning has largely melded with the 
meaning of other nations’ analogous provisions. 
The example of the Equal Protection Clause illustrates the 
hurdles such a theory would face.  A melding of that provision with 
equality provisions in foreign constitutions would require that 
 
the moral assumptions on which Bowers v. Hardwick was based). 
 122. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994-96 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]his court has long considered as 
relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards 
roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable 
circumstances.”). 
 123. See infra Parts III.B-C. 
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those foreign provisions have developed in parallel fashion to the 
largely idiosyncratic evolution of American equal protection.  In 
particular, foreign equality law would have to place special 
emphasis on racial equality, with other equality claims relegated to 
a more amorphous concern with arbitrariness and animus.124  Such 
parallel development is not out of the question: racial 
discrimination has been at the forefront of many nations’ evolving 
equality jurisprudence, and racial classifications have also earned 
the special opprobrium of international law.  On the other hand, 
different nations’ unique cultures and histories may lead their 
equality law to focus just as fundamentally on religious, class, or 
caste discrimination, sometimes in stark contrast to American 
constitutional jurisprudence.125  If one interprets the Equal 
Protection Clause as fundamentally evincing a dual concern for 
racial discrimination and more generally for arbitrary 
discrimination of any type, then it might be difficult to justify 
foreign borrowing at this core level, given the uniqueness of this 
combination. 
Conversely, one could read the Equal Protection Clause as 
fundamentally vacuous, in the sense that equality itself is a concept 
that has no concept aside from moral determinations about which 
groups deserve to be treated the same.  Again, in such a case 
foreign law qua law has no relevance to American constitutional 
interpretation; indeed, in such a case there is no such thing as true 
equal protection law. To be sure, foreign law could be useful in 
adjudicating equal protection claims, but only by providing 
empirical inputs or social context, as described in the previous 
subsection.126  However, other readings of equal protection might 
be more hospitable to a more fundamental use of foreign law.  One 
interpretive theory would read the texts of constitutional 
guarantees such as equal protection as too vacuous to provide 
doctrine precise enough to govern the outcome of actual cases.127  
 
 124. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 522 (examining scrutiny levels applied to 
equal protection claims based on gender and race). 
 125. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (suggesting fundamental differences between American and 
European understandings of what government can do with regard to expressing 
religious opinion); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971) (concluding that 
discrimination based on wealth receives only rational basis scrutiny). 
 126. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 127. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 522-23 (examining the Supreme Court’s 
methodology for evaluating equal protection claims).  See generally DOUGLAS RAE, 
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Moreover, the distance between the precise intent of the drafters 
and the underlying principles of their handiwork may have grown 
too large to justify relying on such precise intent.128  In those cases, 
an interpretive theory may call for finding meaning in the Clause’s 
surrounding context, examining the values that have been 
constitutionalized there, and construing the provision at issue in 
light of that context.  It has been argued, for example, that in 
interpreting state constitutional provisions that mimic federal 
provisions, state courts should not ground a differing 
interpretation of the state provision on some fictional cultural 
distinction of the state’s people, but instead on whatever 
distinctions might appear through examination of the other 
constitutional commitments made by the people of that state.129  
Under this theory, then, the meaning of the provision at issue can 
be found, at least in part, by reference to the values otherwise 
enshrined as foundational by the state’s people.130 
This interpretive method could apply to the question of 
 
EQUALITIES (1989). 
 128. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2888 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
It is our duty, therefore, to interpret the First Amendment’s command 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” 
not by merely asking what those words meant to observers at the time of 
the founding, but instead by deriving from the Clause’s text and history 
the broad principles that remain valid today.  As we have said in the 
context of statutory interpretation, legislation “often [goes] beyond the 
principal evil [at which the statute was aimed] to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather 
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”  
In similar fashion, we have construed the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit segregated schools, even though 
those who drafted that Amendment evidently thought that separate was 
not unequal.  We have held that the same Amendment prohibits 
discrimination against individuals on account of their gender, despite the 
fact that the contemporaries of the Amendment “doubt[ed] very much 
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination 
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be 
held to come within the purview of this provision,” Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).  And we have construed “evolving standards of 
decency” to make impermissible practices that were not considered 
“cruel and unusual” at the founding. 
Id. (footnote and some citations omitted). 
 129. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 
84 VA. L. REV. 389 (1998) (examining state constitutionalism in light of 
constitutional history rather than social history). 
 130. Id. 
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borrowing from foreign law.  Under this theory, courts would 
consider whether a foreign nation’s equality law is surrounded by a 
context of other law that makes it defensible to find in that nation’s 
equality law an analogue to what is found in the Equal Protection 
Clause.  To the extent that other nations have enshrined in their 
basic documents commitments similar to those found in the U.S. 
Constitution, it might be appropriate to consider those nations’ 
equality guarantees as analogous to that in the Equal Protection 
Clause, and thus interpretations of those foreign law guarantees as 
instructive in interpreting our own.  By contrast, those nations 
whose basic commitments differ from our own would provide poor 
models for borrowing. 
Under this theory of “whole constitution interpretation,”131 a 
nation that guarantees equality but nevertheless has an established 
religion, or a religion qualification test for office-holding, would 
not be a good candidate as a source of meaning for the Equal 
Protection Clause, given the linkage American doctrine has drawn 
between the non-establishment principle and equality of 
citizenship.132  Similarly, a nation whose constitution grants 
individuals affirmative rights against the government, such as rights 
to a basic level of material well-being, might also be a problematic 
borrowing source, at least for equal protection claims that are 
based on the government’s failure to provide the material 
resources necessary to exercise a right on the same terms as 
wealthier Americans.133 
This theory goes some way toward answering a troubling 
question pertaining to foreign borrowing, regardless of the 
doctrine at issue: from which nations should we borrow?  
Commentators have objected, for example, to the Supreme Court’s 
recent use of foreign law, describing it as selective.134  The theory 
 
 131. This theory echoes, if distantly, Akhil Amar’s theory of intratextualism, in 
which he argues that constitutional language should be understood in relation to 
how the same, or similar, language is used elsewhere in the document.  See Akhil 
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 132. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) 
(expressing, as a core concern of the Establishment Clause, the principle that an 
individual’s religious views should not mark him as either an insider or an outsider 
in the political community). 
 133. Compare, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding no 
constitutional right to government funding for abortions), with Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding that a party’s inability to pay did not 
justify a State from denying access to courts to obtain a divorce). 
 134. See, e.g., Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and 
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sketched above answers the more general question about from 
whom to borrow, by answering that American courts should borrow 
from those nations whose constitutional commitments in general 
situate their relevant guarantee (e.g., equality) in roughly the same 
doctrinal place as does the American provision at issue (e.g., the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
While this theory begins to answer the question of from whom 
we should borrow, it still raises difficult questions for courts.  In 
particular, under this theory courts would have to employ a case-by-
case or doctrine-by-doctrine approach when determining the 
appropriateness of borrowing from a given nation’s constitutional 
law.  For example, an American court considering a sexual 
orientation equality claim might appropriately borrow from a 
foreign nation’s equality jurisprudence when that foreign nation’s 
constitutional context includes an effective anti-Establishment 
principle, so that religious disapproval of homosexuality carries the 
same low constitutional weight it seems to in the United States after 
Lawrence.135  On the other hand, a court considering a claim that 
 
Constitutional Governance, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 59, 74 (2004) (discussing Justice 
Stevens’ use of foreign law in Atkins); see also Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or 
Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
1, 24 (2005) (examining “cherry-picking” of foreign law).  Of course, in Lawrence 
itself, Justice Kennedy used foreign law not so simply to derive the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause, but also to refute the argument made by Chief Justice 
Burger’s concurrence in Bowers that western civilization had consistently 
condemned same-sex intimacy. 
 135. Note, of course, that even this seemingly simple statement immediately 
becomes complicated by the need to determine the reality of the foreign nation’s 
law.  For example, the United Kingdom, from which Justice Kennedy drew much 
of his foreign law support in Lawrence, has a head of state that is simultaneously 
and ex officio the head of a church.  What this caveat suggests, then, is that the 
determination which foreign legal systems are relevantly like our own requires 
careful consideration looking beyond surface characteristics such as the United 
Kingdom’s official religious establishment.  See, e.g., Peter Cumper, Religious 
Human Rights in the United Kingdom, 10 EMORY J. INT’L L. 115 (2000) (describing 
scope of religious liberty in the United Kingdom); A. Krishnaswami, Study of 
Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, at 47, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960) (describing the establishment of religion in the 
United Kingdom as “not much more than a mere historic relic”), quoted in Nathan 
Adams, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 25 n.176 (2000); Jonathan Sacks, 
Antidisestablishmentarianism—A Great Word and a Good Ideal, TIMES (London), July 
20, 2002, at 44 (“(Imagine) entering a crowded room, knowing no one, and then 
discovering to your relief that there is a host who greets you, introduces you to 
others, and makes you feel at home.  In a multifaith England, the Church of 
England is that host.”), quoted in Paul Salamanca, The Liberal Polity and Illiberalism in 
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denial of state funding for abortions violates the Equal Protection 
Clause might find it less defensible to borrow from that same 
foreign nation’s equality jurisprudence if that foreign nation 
situates its equality guarantee within a context of a constitutional 
commitment that government provide basic material goods.  In the 
gay rights hypothetical, the foreign nation’s equality law can be 
understood as similar to that of American law, and thus legitimate 
persuasive authority, because the surrounding context of the 
equality guarantee is similar.  But in the abortion funding example, 
the fundamentally different understandings of what the 
government is constitutionally obligated to provide necessarily 
make the seemingly similar equality provisions not equivalent. 
Thus, the requirement that a court consider not just the 
parallelism between U.S. and a given nation’s foreign constitutional 
structure in general, but with regard to how that foreign law would 
approach a particular claim, requires that courts determine the 
appropriateness of borrowing at a fairly specific level of generality.  
In short, it requires the domestic court to consider carefully what 
exactly that foreign law is by examining its context.136 
C.  Substantive Rights Claims and Foreign Law 
Foreign law borrowing in cases involving substantive rights can 
be appropriately analyzed under the theories sketched out above.  
However, substantive claims also raise unique issues that warrant 
separate discussion.  In one sense, substantive rights are less 
amenable to foreign borrowing because the constitutional 
provisions bestowing those rights may have more determinate 
meanings based on judicially cognizable sources.  This 
characteristic distinguishes them from equality rights, given the 
legally vacuous (if socially rich) concept of equality.  For example, a 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures might be 
comprehensible based on the framers’ understanding of what 
constitutes a search, or a guarantee of free speech might be 
properly analyzed against the content-neutrality rule, which itself 
derives from an understanding of what is required by the 
Constitution’s assumption of popular sovereignty.137  Because 
 
Religious Traditions, 4 BARRY L. REV. 97, 100 (2003). 
 136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 529.  For the classic statement of the self-
government rationale for speech protection, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 
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courts can interpret these provisions by recourse to standard, 
domestic legal sources, one might argue that those sources should 
be the primary interpretive guides.138  The assumption, of course, is 
that such standard legal sources exist and in fact refer back to 
domestic sources of meaning. 
1.  Foreign Law as a Source of Due Process Doctrine 
The development of American constitutional law makes 
application of this basic idea somewhat more difficult with regard 
to rights that are unenumerated, or explicit but still open-ended. 
The Slaughter-House cases gutted the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the provision the drafters 
probably intended to serve as the primary source of individuals’ 
substantive rights against states.139  This development forced the 
Court in later years to turn to the Due Process Clause as a source of 
substantive rights.140  As has often been pointed out, the 
substitution of the Due Process Clause for the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as the source of substantive rights has rendered 
the entire field of substantive constitutional rights far more 
uncertain, given the relatively more determinate nature of the term 
“privileges and immunities,” and the inherently amorphous nature 
of the concept of substantive due process.141 
The shift to due process has largely decoupled the main 
substantive rights provision in the U.S. Constitution from text and 
common law precedent.  In turn, this move may make it more 
appropriate to borrow foreign law.  In the case of substantive due 
process, foreign law could be appropriately used not just as a 
practical decisional input, as described above, but also as a source 
of meaning for the right itself.  Despite the best attempts of Justice 
Scalia and those of similar mind, the Supreme Court has never 
repudiated the project of finding substantive rights in the Due 
Process Clause.  Indeed it has continued to move, albeit cautiously, 
toward expanding the scope of rights it protects.  Moreover, the 
Court has failed to unite behind a due process methodology based 
solely on history and tradition.142  Thus, the court’s continued 
 
357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 138. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 530. 
 139. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 44 (1872). 
 140. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 528-35. 
 141. See id. at 557. 
 142. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 136-37 (1989) (Brennan, 
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search for new due process rights remains only partially tethered to 
domestic historical and legal traditions, and thus, at least 
potentially open to a broader set of decisional inputs. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence hints at the broader 
scope foreign law can play in the due process inquiry.  Notably, his 
discussion of substantive due process deemphasizes inquiry into the 
historical pedigree of the right at issue.143  Instead, Justice 
Kennedy’s inquiry began in earnest with a relatively modern case, 
Griswold v. Connecticut, and its progeny.144  Lawrence provides very 
little discussion of whether the right at issue—however framed—
was affirmatively protected or valued by earlier American law and 
society.145  Rather, when Justice Kennedy did address the history of 
affirmative legal protection for sexual intimacy, he looked at more 
recent legal developments, which he described as “show[ing] an 
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection” to same-
sex intimacy.146 
It is in this part of the opinion that Justice Kennedy used 
foreign law.  In particular, he pointed not just to recent legal 
evolution in the United States, but also statutory and judicial 
developments in the United Kingdom and the European 
Community.147  On one reading, Justice Kennedy’s citation of 
foreign law reflects nothing more than a refutation of Chief Justice 
Burger’s concurrence in Bowers, which relied on a supposed 
Western consensus disapproving of same-sex intimacy.148  That 
concurrence, by relying on such an asserted consensus, invited 
refutation by citation of contrary western European authority.149  
However, the placement of this argument suggests that Justice 
Kennedy intended to use foreign law to accomplish more than 
simply refuting the Burger concurrence.  Rather, he used foreign 
law in his affirmative case, as evidence of “an emerging 
 
J., dissenting) (noting the lack of agreement on the proper methodology for 
analyzing substantive due process issues); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 512 
U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (adopting Justice 
Harlan’s view that due process asks whether the state has enacted an arbitrary 
imposition or purposeless restraint); id. at 789-90 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (also adopting Justice Harlan’s due process view). 
 143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003). 
 144. Id. at 566. 
 145. See generally id. 
 146. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 569, 573. 
 148. Id. at 572-73. 
 149. See generally id. at 562-79. 
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awareness”150 of the meaning of same-sex intimacy in the same 
foreign societies whose legal principles Chief Justice Burger 
thought he had discerned, to the opposite effect, in Bowers.151 
Read in this latter sense, Justice Kennedy’s citation of foreign 
precedent suggests that foreign law can inform the fundamental 
meaning of due process, by identifying same-sex intimacy as one of 
the rights due process protects.152  In this way, foreign law 
constitutes far more than a mere empirical input into a calculus 
defined solely by domestic law.  Rather, it informs the Court’s 
understanding of what comprises the basic human freedom 
protected by the Due Process Clause.  Indeed, to the extent it 
derives from nations whose values we share,153 that foreign law can 
seem as informing the core meaning of the Due Process Clause, via 
the “whole constitution interpretation” method described earlier.  
As such, Justice Kennedy’s analysis raises the possibility of an 
aggressive use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. 
2.  Due Process “Liberty” as an Entry Point for Foreign Law 
Lawrence may have opened the door to consideration of 
foreign law in defining the basic scope of constitutional protections 
through a surprisingly direct, but potentially far-reaching, means: 
its focus on liberty.  As Randy Barnett has noted, Justice Kennedy’s 
analysis in Lawrence is striking for its focus on the guarantee of 
“liberty” as opposed to “privacy.”154  This focus caused much of 
Lawrence’s muddying of standard due process doctrine.  By focusing 
on the textual right to liberty rather than on the unenumerated 
right to privacy, Justice Kennedy’s analysis arguably does away with 
the need to determine whether the interest at stake in a given case 
is a “fundamental privacy right” or a mere “liberty interest.”155  In 
turn, it can pass over the question of what degree of scrutiny to 
apply to the challenged government action.156  Notably, Lawrence 
 
 150. Id. at 572. 
 151. Id. at 572-73. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 576-77. 
 154. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence 
v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 (2003). 
 155. Id. at 31. 
 156. But cf., e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 162-64 (1973) (identifying 
abortion as part of the fundamental right to privacy, but acknowledging strong 
state interests in the preservation of fetal life). 
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ignored both of these questions.157 
Lawrence’s focus on liberty could ultimately globalize due 
process analysis.  By eschewing the standard due process 
methodology of determining the fundamentality of the interest and 
then applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, Justice Kennedy 
does away with an analysis that looks more closely at American 
society than at global standards.  While the standard inquiry into 
whether an interest is fundamental looks in large part to American 
traditions,158 the closest Justice Kennedy comes to explicitly 
acknowledging the importance of the right at issue is his statement 
that same-sex intimacy “has been accepted as an integral part of 
human freedom in many other countries.”159  It becomes even 
clearer that this statement is the fulcrum of the argument when he 
then immediately concludes that Texas had not shown any “more 
legitimate or urgent” interest in circumscribing that personal 
choice than had been revealed in the foreign cases.160  Those two 
sentences are the heart of whatever individual right/state interest 
balancing Lawrence performs.  Indeed, when Justice Kennedy 
quotes from Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers and elevates those 
quotations into the rule controlling the result in Lawrence, he 
returns to the combination of liberty and the insufficiency of a state 
interest in promoting a particular morality.161  Once again, Justice 
Kennedy provides no analysis of the weight of the individual’s 
interest, beyond saying that it is part of the liberty that has been 
acknowledged by foreign courts and legislatures.162 
By focusing on liberty, Justice Kennedy may have freed due 
process analysis from the requirement of examining only American 
 
 157. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out these 
omissions). 
 158. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) (stating that the crucial substantive due process question is whether the 
interest at stake is solidly grounded in American history and tradition, and 
concluding that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely 
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in American history and 
tradition.). 
 159. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 577-78. 
 162. Indeed, the only other place in the opinion where Justice Kennedy argues 
affirmatively, rather than simply criticizing Bowers, is a vague, conclusory statement 
that “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for [the 
purposes of personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education], just as heterosexual persons 
do.”  Id. at 574. 
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law.  As noted earlier, Lawrence’s only real description of the legal 
importance of same-sex intimacy identifies it as a part of human 
freedom.163  That description is nowhere near as parochial as the 
descriptions standard due process doctrine uses to determine 
whether an interest is fundamental: “a principle of justice so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,”164 a principle “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,”165 or “an enduring American tradition.”166  Indeed, 
the standard doctrine’s very idea of a deeply rooted tradition—
necessary perhaps in order to justify protection of an 
unenumerated privacy right—suggests more of a domestic focus: 
when we think of deep roots, we necessarily think of our roots, our 
history, and our tradition.167  The semantic and conceptual distance 
between Lawrence and what came before it is confirmed by the fact 
that Lawrence actually relied heavily on foreign law when 
determining the constitutional status of the claimed right. 
Lawrence can be read more narrowly, however.  It may be that 
Justice Kennedy concluded simply that the State’s morality-based 
argument failed to overcome the force of the liberty at stake, given 
the illegitimacy of such a state interest.  Lawrence’s language also 
supports this more limited reading.  As noted earlier, Justice 
 
 163. Id. at 577. 
 164. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
 165. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 166. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).  Of course, other criteria 
for the fundamentality of due process rights are more cosmopolitan.  Most 
notably, a strand of cases—perhaps best understood as dealing with questions of 
fair judicial process—has looked at Anglo-American legal traditions.  See, e.g., 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968) (considering whether Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial applies to states via Due Process Clause).  Other 
cases have spoken more generally (and perhaps less precisely) of rights 
fundamental to “civilization.”  See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  Still, it is worth 
wondering whether a tradition not strongly established in the United States would 
nevertheless be found to be fundamental, based on some supposed general 
acceptance either in those nations whose legal systems are based on English 
common law, or in some wider civilization.  If nothing else, Lawrence may signal a 
more cosmopolitan approach in actual practice from these earlier cases, given its 
heavy reliance on foreign law.  See supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text. 
 167. Indeed, even Justice Brennan’s more rights-protective approach to 
substantive due process did not exclude consideration of American history.  See, 
e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the plurality’s “exclusively historical analysis” as an “unfortunate 
departure . . . from sound constitutional decisionmaking”). 
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Kennedy closed his attack on Hardwick by describing the right at 
issue as “an integral part of human freedom in many other 
countries” and then immediately concluding that Texas had shown 
no more “urgent or legitimate” interest in circumscribing that 
liberty than had governments in the foreign cases.168  One way to 
read this ambiguous language is that the Court’s focus on liberty 
applies only in the rare situation where the government’s action is 
supported by no legitimate interest.  Indeed, such a reading would 
fit within more standard due process law, which recognizes many 
interests under the “liberty” heading, but also usually gives 
government much deference when determining whether 
infringements on liberty are appropriate, but which always requires 
at least a legitimate justification for that infringement, even if the 
court has to hypothesize it.169 
Thus, Lawrence may embrace “a presumption of liberty,”170 or 
its analysis may simply have flowed from the uniquely weak 
argument made by the State.  Regardless, the point remains that 
shifting the analytical focus to liberty frees the court from the need 
to rely on tradition, and thus, on American tradition, and thereby 
allows consideration of non-domestic interpretive sources.  In turn, 
such a focus on a generic, global liberty may ultimately provide a 
portal through which American courts can receive foreign law 
understandings of basic substantive rights.  After Lawrence’s 
rejection of morality-based arguments for suppressing liberty,171 the 
size and significance of such a portal may well turn on whether the 
State can articulate a utilitarian basis for the challenged law.172  For 
this reason, this portal for reception of foreign law may turn out to 
be especially significant for gay rights claims, since impairments of 
gay rights so often seem to be based more on moral disapproval or 
 
 168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 169. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) 
(including among rights protected by procedural due process the right to 
contract); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) 
(recognizing a presumption that facts exist necessary to justify government 
regulation of commercial transactions). 
 170. See generally Barnett, supra note 154. 
 171. See 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003). 
 172. This development also synchronizes substantive due process law with 
equal protection law, which already largely disapproves of morality-based 
justifications for unequal treatment.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (stating that a “bare . . . desire to harm” an unpopular group 
is insufficient justification for unequal treatment). 
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dislike than any true public purpose.173 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Gay rights litigants can also deploy international law 
principles, to the extent that such principles actually support gay 
rights claims.  Unlike foreign law, international law binding the 
United States is enforceable in American courts.174  Still, claims 
based on international law raise difficult questions for American 
courts.  The status of treaties as binding law turns on whether the 
treaty is considered self-executing, a complex inquiry that turns on 
a variety of factors.175  For its part, the unique character of 
customary international law makes it difficult both to determine its 
status relative to treaties or domestic statutes176 and indeed, even to 
discern its very existence.177 
In the case of individual rights claims, part of the reason for 
the unsettled place of international law is the existence of similar 
domestic constitutional principles in the Bill of Rights and 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Together these provisions encompass 
many of, though not all, the subjects addressed by international 
human rights norms.178  Undoubtedly, the longevity and (to some 
 
 173. See William D. Araiza, ENDA Before it Starts: Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees Under the 
Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act,” 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 29-36 
(2002) (discussing whether a large amount of anti-gay discrimination would fail 
the rational basis test). 
 174. The classic statement of the status of international law in American courts 
was delivered by the Supreme Court in Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900): 
“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”  Id.  As Louis 
Henkin observes, this statement by Justice Gray “was neither new nor controversial 
when made in 1900, since he was merely restarting what had been established 
principle for the fathers of American jurisprudence and for their British legal 
ancestors.”  See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. 
L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1984). 
 175. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 695 (1995). 
 176. See Henkin, supra note 174, at 1561-67. 
 177. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (3d 
ed. 1999) (“The determination of customary international law is more an art than 
a scientific method.”). 
 178. In particular, these provisions do not encompass positive rights, such as 
those to employment or other material security, that have been the subject of 
international human rights agreements.  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 23, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc 
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Americans) the apparent comprehensiveness of American 
constitutional jurisprudence, when combined with the lack of 
parallel foreign constitutional jurisprudential traditions, have made 
American courts and lawmakers prone to assuming that 
international human rights jurisprudence adds nothing to the 
American tradition.179  To that extent, international human rights 
law might be viewed as superfluous, with no reason for litigants or 
courts to place independent reliance on it.180  Alternatively, to the 
extent international norms provide more protection than the 
Constitution, the United States has often either included a 
reservation in its treaty ratification181 or declared the treaty non-
self-executing,182 or, in the case of customary law, objected 
persistently enough to raise questions about whether the United 
States has gained exemption from the customary rule.183 
This Article skirts the difficult, if important, question of how, 
in the abstract, particular international law principles qua 
international law apply in American courts.184  Instead, it focuses 
on how international law can influence the development of 
domestic constitutional doctrine.  This choice reflects American 
courts’ willingness to use international law as an aid in interpreting 
 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (right to work). 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, 
J., concurring) (noting the history of American uniqueness in constitutional 
adjudication); S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 23, 102d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 19, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. S8068 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992) (stating the 
view of the Senate Committee that existing U.S. law generally complies with the 
Covenant). 
 180. Such a view might even lead the Senate either to fail to enact 
implementing legislation, or even to declare that a treaty is not self-executing.  See 
Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward 
a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 78-80 (1996) 
(recounting how the Senate used this justification to declare the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights non-self-executing). 
 181. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2005) (noting U.S. 
reservation to the provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights prohibiting juvenile executions). 
 182. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 131-32 
(1999) (noting history of non-self-executing declarations appended to Senate 
ratifications of human rights treaties). 
 183. See, e.g., Laurin B. Kallins, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Is the United 
States in Contravention of International Law?, 17 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 77, 98-101 
(1993) (examining the conduct of the United States in relation to international 
law norms dealing with the juvenile death penalty). 
 184. For an introduction to this topic, see Henkin, supra note 174. 
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domestic legal provisions, a willingness shown as recently as last 
year.185  When that willingness is combined with new domestic 
doctrine more hospitable to gay rights claims and international 
law’s increased recognition of gay rights, it becomes clear that this 
seemingly more modest use of international law offers real 
opportunities to gay rights advocates.  This part of the Article 
considers these opportunities.  It begins by examining the issues 
surrounding the role of treaties and non-textual international law 
in domestic legal interpretation.  It concludes by briefly examining 
the substance of those international law norms that may be useful 
to gay rights litigators. 
A.  Treaty-Based Law and Constitutional Analysis 
Justice Kennedy’s focus on more modern developments as the 
relevant tradition for due process purposes, in addition to affecting 
the role of foreign law in American courts, may also pave the way 
for recognition of international legal principles contained in 
treaties ratified by the Senate.  As noted above, norms included in 
international agreements to which the United States is a party may 
or may not have binding effect themselves, depending on whether 
the agreement is self-executing.186  Moreover, such provisions may 
be written at too high a level of generality to render them capable 
of providing precise, determinate rules for deciding individual 
cases. At the same time, American courts may find it politically or 
doctrinally difficult to rely on foreign or international tribunals’ 
interpretations of those terms.187  In addition, the existence of 
general liberty and equality provisions in the Constitution only 
complicates the question of whether distinct meaning can be 
gleaned from international agreements protecting the rights to 
 
 185. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198-1200 (using foreign and international law to 
“confirm” the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment).  Roper is 
discussed in more detail below.  See text accompanying infra notes 200-225; see also 
Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 74, at 72-80 (discussing other cases in which 
American courts used foreign and international law as aids in interpreting 
domestic legal provisions); Helfer & Miller, supra note 180, at 82 (“Courts in the 
United States have regularly used human rights treaties to inform state and federal 
constitutional standards even where the treaties do not create an independent 
cause of action.”). 
 186. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Helfer & Miller, supra note 180, at 82 (distinguishing between the 
binding nature of the text of an international agreement and foreign and 
international tribunals’ interpretation of that text). 
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basic human dignity and equality.188 
Even if they are not themselves formally binding or sufficiently 
precise to furnish a judicially enforceable rule of decision, 
substantive rights norms can still play a role in domestic rights 
adjudications.  In most cases other than those dealing with criminal 
procedure and punishment and freedom of speech and 
conscience, substantive international norms can play their most 
significant role by supporting a claim that the norm at issue 
constitutes a component of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.189  Given Lawrence’s focus on more recent history 
when determining whether certain conduct is protected by the 
liberty guarantee, the ratification of a treaty surely supports the 
claim that American society has recognized that interest as 
significant.  Treaty ratification reflects an explicit and deliberative 
embrace of particular values by a body that has perhaps the 
strongest claim to represent the nation.  Thus, ratification of a 
treaty containing a human rights norm reflects, as much as almost 
any other governmental conduct can, a national embrace of that 
norm as a component of individual freedom, even if ratification is 
deemed, via a non-self-executing statement, to lack formal 
domestic legal effect. 
Treaty-based equality norms can be thought of as playing a 
similar role, even if the different natures of substantive and equality 
guaranties render the analysis slightly different.  As the author has 
argued elsewhere, the legal concept of equality is vacuous in the 
absence of a determination that a given criterion or criterion-
defined group is relevantly different, such that it is appropriate to 
 
 188. Compare, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 3, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ 
b/a_ccpr.htm, with, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) 
(explaining that gender classifications in order to be constitutional must have an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification”). 
 189. Of course, this is not to minimize the role that international norms can 
play in helping courts define the meaning of the criminal procedure and 
punishment and freedom of speech and conscience provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.  Indeed, in two recent cases the Supreme Court has cited international law 
as support for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment.  See Roper, 125 S. Ct. 1183; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002); see also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (canvassing foreign and international law to 
determine the merit of a claim that excessive delay before execution violated the 
Eighth Amendment).  See generally infra Part IV.B. 
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treat them differently.190  But the determinations that constitute 
equality law in contemporary America—e.g., that bank robbers are 
relevantly different from bank account holders, that men are 
(usually) not relevantly different from women, and that the 
mentally retarded are (sometimes) relevantly different from 
mainstream society—do not rest on traditional legal sources.  
Instead, judgments about which groups and characteristics are in 
fact different reflect society’s value judgments, not conclusions 
reached after study of standard legal sources.191 
Thus, when Congress enacts equality-protecting legislation, it 
should normally be thought of as playing a more direct role in 
determining the meaning of equality, within broad outer 
parameters set by courts.192  For this reason, the author has 
suggested that Congress should have especially broad power to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause, as compared with other more 
substantive constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.193  However, in the case of treaties, the failure to act 
by the means constitutionally prescribed for Congress to enforce 
the equal protection guarantee—by a full-blown statute that 
satisfies the standard for “appropriate” enforcement legislation194—
means that Senate ratification should not be thought of as 
supplying direct meaning to the Equal Protection Clause. 
Of course, the Senate’s adoption of an equality norm via treaty 
ratification remains quite relevant in illuminating contemporary 
American attitudes toward what equality means,195 just as its 
embrace of a particular substantive norm is highly probative of 
what rights are especially valued in American society.  Thus, the 
Senate’s adoption of an equality norm in a treaty should be highly 
relevant when a court considers the meaning of equal protection.  
For example, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger 
cited an international agreement as support for the majority’s 
 
 190. See generally Araiza, supra note 19. 
 191. See id. at 554-55. 
 192. See id. at 566-68 (explaining the relationship between judicially declared 
and legislatively determined equal protection law). 
 193. See Araiza, supra note 173, at 61-64; see generally Araiza, supra note 19. 
 194. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”) 
(emphasis added). 
 195. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 542-59 (setting forth the characteristics of 
Congress that make it a good source for determining the contemporary American 
understanding of equality). 
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analysis of an equal protection challenge to the University of 
Michigan Law School’s race-based affirmative action plan.196  In 
particular, she approved in principle the majority’s warning that 
affirmative action plans should be of limited duration, and cited 
the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, which included an analogous limitation.197  Even 
though Justice Ginsburg questioned whether the persistence of 
American racism made the majority’s twenty-five-year limit too 
optimistic,198 her use of an international treaty norm to illuminate 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause reflects how 
Congress, through its treaty power, can affect how courts read 
constitutional provisions. 
B.  Non-Controlling International Law and Constitutional Analysis: The 
Example of the Eighth Amendment 
International law may develop without formal American 
participation.  Customary global norms may develop without 
American consent, or in the face of American objection.  Treaties 
may exclude the United States, or the United States may choose 
not to sign or Senate not to ratify.  Alternatively, such signature or 
ratification could be accompanied by a reservation that restricts the 
scope of the American legal commitment.  In such cases, there is 
no question of the international norm formally binding United 
States courts to the derogation of otherwise valid federal or state 
law. 
Even in such cases, international law can inform the content of 
domestic constitutional law.  As sketched out above, Lawrence’s 
focus on liberty has the potential to globalize due process analysis 
by embracing as the key doctrinal concept an idea that is globally 
embraced, and thus susceptible to global definition and 
application.199  That global meaning can derive not only from 
foreign courts’ interpretations of their own domestic laws, but also 
from international law, whether treaty-based or customary. 
An example—albeit not one interpreting the Due Process 
Clause per se—is Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case holding that the 
 
 196. 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 197. Id. (citing International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106, Annex art. 2(2), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/6014, Annex art. 2(2) (Dec. 21, 1965)). 
 198. Id. at 344-46. 
 199. See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
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death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.200  After determining, based solely on 
domestic law principles, that the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
juvenile-crime executions,201 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
concluded its analysis with a canvas of world opinion on the 
issue.202  According to the Court, foreign and international 
authorities, while not “controlling,” remained “instructive” for its 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, and the global consensus 
against such executions “confirm[ed]” the court’s conclusion.203 
Importantly, the Roper court conceded that the United States 
had explicitly refrained from adopting an international legal norm 
prohibiting juvenile executions.204  Thus, if international law was to 
matter to Roper, it could not be because the United States had 
explicitly ratified or acquiesced in the customary development of 
an international law norm that the Court could then cite either for 
its own binding force or as an aid to interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment.205  Nevertheless, the Court found the global 
consensus against juvenile-crime execution to be “instructive.”206  
 
 200. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 201. See id. at 1187-98. 
 202. See id. at 1198-1200. 
 203. Id. at 1198.  But cf. id. at 1206, 1215-16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(agreeing with the majority’s general approach to international and foreign law’s 
role in constitutional interpretation, but finding that such law could play no 
confirmatory role in this case due to the lack of a domestic consensus against the 
juvenile-crime death penalty). 
It is unclear—and for our purposes unimportant—whether Roper viewed the 
international consensus as solely a treaty-based norm or a rule of customary 
international law.  In either case, the norm did not apply to the United States.  See 
infra note 204.  For that reason in either case the Court faced the question of how 
to use an international law rule to inform the meaning of a domestic provision 
when that norm was not formally binding on the United States. 
 204. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting American reservation to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ provision banning juvenile 
executions); see also id. at 1199 (noting American failure to ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which bans juvenile-crime 
executions). 
 205. Indeed, under standard international law doctrine, persistent objection to 
a rule prevents that rule from becoming binding on the objector as a matter of 
international law. See Kallins, supra note 183, at 98 (suggesting that the United 
States had persistently objected to international prohibitions on the juvenile death 
penalty).  See generally Holning Lau, Comment, Rethinking the Persistent Objector 
Doctrine in International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 495 (2005) 
(explaining the doctrine of the persistent objector). 
 206. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (citing international agreements banning the 
juvenile-crime death penalty and noting the near-unanimity of state practice on 
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This step can only be understood by concluding that the court 
found global opinion—both foreign and international—relevant in 
some larger sense. 
A careful reading of Roper reveals how those foreign and 
international authorities, even while not formally binding on U.S. 
courts, nevertheless informed the Court’s analysis.  One of the key 
issues in the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis was whether the 
death penalty was being reserved for offenders who committed “‘a 
narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme 
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”207  In 
Roper, the Court, in addition to simply citing the global consensus 
against the juvenile-crime death penalty, also attributed that 
consensus to a particular consideration, namely, “the 
understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of 
young people may often be a factor in the crime.”208  Thus, the 
Court suggested that international law mattered to the issue before 
it because world opinion had recognized a factor—the moral 
culpability of a class of offenders—that constituted a part of the 
domestic doctrinal analysis.209  Because global opinion addressed 
the same concerns addressed by the cognate constitutional 
provision, that opinion properly influenced, in Roper’s view, the 
Court’s conclusion on that issue.210  In turn, that conclusion 
properly influenced the Court’s interpretation of the domestic 
constitutional provision.211  One can easily draw a parallel between 
 
the issue). 
 207. Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 208. Id. at 1199-1200 (explaining the reasons for the United Kingdom’s 
decision to abolish the juvenile death penalty). 
 209. See id. at 1195 (discussing juveniles’ “lack of maturity and . . . 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” as a factor that differentiates juveniles 
from the worst offenders, the class to which the Constitution requires capital 
punishment to be limited); see also id. at 1194 (setting forth the doctrine limiting 
capital punishment to the worst offenders). 
 210. See also supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 211. Admittedly, this analysis does not square perfectly with the Court’s own 
rhetoric that international sources “confirmed” its analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor, taking the majority opinion at its word, 
parted company with it by concluding that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
doctrine did not support the majority’s result, thus making moot any question of 
international law’s “confirmation” of that result.  See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1206, 1215-
16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  But taking the Court’s opinion at its word also 
requires dealing with its citation of a substantive rationale for the global consensus 
against the juvenile-crime death penalty.  See id. at 1200 (majority opinion) 
(reiterating the global consensus against that practice and then noting that that 
consensus “rest[ed] in large part on the understanding that the instability and 
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this analysis and Lawrence’s conclusion that foreign law had 
revealed the lack of any legitimate state interest in suppressing the 
liberty to engage in same-sex intimacy.212 
Still, this explanation fails to account for the unique relevance 
of international, as opposed to foreign, law to the domestic 
constitutional question.  Particular foreign nations may have 
altered their own criminal punishment schemes in response to 
conclusions about juveniles’ lessened culpability, and those 
nations’ determinations would of course have been relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment issue.  Indeed, Roper itself cited the change in 
British law as particularly relevant to the Eighth Amendment, given 
the historic relationship between the U.K. and the U.S. and the 
British law ancestry of the Eighth Amendment.213  Justice Breyer’s 
dissent from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Knight v. Florida,214 
another death penalty case, also argued that foreign law was 
relevant when it “applied standards roughly comparable to our own 
constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances.”215  
But what about international law? 
Here, it may become relevant to consider a second aspect of 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  When faced with a 
claim that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court, 
in addition to considering issues of proportionality and offender 
culpability, also asks whether a national consensus has developed 
that a particular punishment should not be imposed in a given set 
 
emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime”). 
To truly integrate this part of the majority’s analysis into its international-law-
as-confirmatory rhetoric, one might speculate that domestic opinion—the 
“national consensus” that both the majority and Justice O’Connor searched for in 
their analyses—implicitly included moral and empirical conclusions about the 
relevance of juveniles’ “instability and emotional imbalance.”  Thus, after Justice 
O’Connor concluded that a domestic consensus had not gelled, she could then 
conclude that global opinion on those moral and empirical issues was simply 
irrelevant.  Therefore, the confirmation to be found in global opinion referred 
not to the ultimate question whether the juvenile-crime death penalty violated 
human dignity; instead, global opinion properly spoke to the subsidiary questions 
of juveniles’ culpability.  In turn, the conclusion on that question would feed into 
the domestic analysis that asked whether death penalty was in fact being reserved 
for those “‘most deserving of execution.’” Id. at 1194 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 
506 U.S. 304, 318 (2003)). 
 212. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
 213. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199-1200. 
 214. 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 215. Id. at 997. 
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/5
01ARAIZA.DOC 1/20/2006  3:42:20 PM 
2006] FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GAY RIGHTS 501 
of circumstances.216  The Court has noted that the “‘clearest and 
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the 
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”217 
This sort of “counting the states” jurisprudence obviously 
parallels the process of determining the content of international 
law.  Customary law is determined in large part by state practice, 
with a customary law norm being declared only after a practice has 
been generally adhered to for a sufficient amount of time.218  Of 
course, significant differences exist between the two 
communities—national and global—that make the analogy 
imperfect.  Most notably for purposes of this Article, customary 
international law arises not just from general acceptance; instead, it 
requires that the acceptance be based on some sense of legal 
obligation.219  By contrast, in the Eighth Amendment context there 
is no obligation that state legislatures have changed their criminal 
punishment schemes because of some sense that higher law 
requires it.  Instead, state legislatures generally change their 
sentencing schemes for policy reasons, presumably including, in 
the case of sensitive issues such as the execution of juveniles or the 
mentally retarded, moral judgments.220 
Still, the fact remains that consensus, or at least agreement 
among multiple parties, matters in determining the content of 
both international law and the Eighth Amendment.  By itself this 
similarity means little for the actual meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment.  However, it would mean more if one assumed that 
the international community counted, even to a limited degree, in 
determining whether a consensus existed with regard to what 
punishments were so disproportionate as to violate the human 
dignity the court has recognized as the foundation of the 
Amendment.221  So understood, Roper’s focus not just on the bare 
 
 216. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 
 217. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
 218. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001).  
General practice is insufficient for a norm to become customary law; in addition, 
compliance with the norm must be based on a sense of legal obligation.  See id. at 
15-16. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323-24 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). 
 221. See, e.g., id. at 311 (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment 
is nothing less than the dignity of man.”) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958)). 
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fact that some nations have rejected the juvenile death penalty,222 
nor even on those nations’ rationales,223 but also on the simple fact 
of global consensus,224 would become comprehensible.225  
International, not just foreign, law, would matter. 
C.  International Community and Gay Rights 
The above analysis implies a broader definition of the 
community whose values should matter when determining 
consensus for purposes of deciding an Eighth Amendment issue.226  
In this broader understanding of community, nations play the role 
otherwise assigned to states.227  For gay rights advocates pressing 
substantive and equality claims, the question becomes how this 
globalization of community, expressed through international 
law,228 can influence the interpretation of domestic constitutional 
provisions such as the Due Process,229 Equal Protection,230 and Free 
Speech Clauses.231 
Part of the answer turns on the particular right at issue, and 
the type of evidence relevant to its interpretation.  For example, 
just as Eighth Amendment issues turn in part on society’s 
judgments of the culpability of different types of offenders, 
substantive due process issues turn to no small degree on the social 
 
 222. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199-1200 (2005). 
 223. See supra notes 207-211 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199 (noting that every nation in the world except 
the United States and Somalia has ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and no ratifying nation has entered a reservation to the 
Convention’s prohibition on juvenile executions). 
 225. See also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting, after a discussion of the 
national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, that “[a]dditional 
evidence . . . reflects a much broader social . . . consensus” against the practice, 
including, among other indicia, the “overwhelming[] disapprov[al]” of the world 
community). 
 226. See supra Part IV.B. 
 227. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(identifying state legislation as the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values”). 
 228. But cf. id. (relying on legislation as an indicator of social consensus). 
 229. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003) (relying on substantive 
due process to protect right to same-sex intimacy). 
 230. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-27 (1996) (relying on equal 
protection to protect gays’ and lesbians’ equal access to government protection). 
 231. See, e.g., Holmes v. Calif. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 
1997) (considering First Amendment challenge to military’s restrictions on service 
by gays and lesbians); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech 
and the U.S. Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1141 (1997). 
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understanding of the conduct for which constitutional protection is 
sought.  Between Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas, “the 
right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy”232 evolved into the 
right to be free of laws “touching upon the most private human 
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the 
home.”233  The evolution in the court’s conceptualization of the 
issue surely derives in part from the change in American culture’s 
understanding of gay America between 1986 and 2003.234  As the 
author has argued elsewhere, equality claims are most firmly 
grounded in such social judgments.235 
In such cases, the community from which the relevant social 
judgments are drawn may become more and more globalized.  As 
explained in an earlier part of this Article, judge-made foreign law 
can play a role as respected statements of social values, made by 
institutions similarly situated to American courts.236  Decisions by 
other foreign government bodies are similarly deserving of respect, 
given their representativeness and the fact that they, again like 
American courts, are faced with the problem of how best to 
exercise sovereign power. 
Beyond governmental entities, however, the global community 
can make its judgments known through a variety of social 
institutions.  Just as domestic entities other than states share in the 
making of social judgments that influence constitutional 
meaning,237 analogous foreign, transnational and international 
entities can help shape a global consensus relevant to the meaning 
of domestic constitutional provisions.  Religious organizations can 
speak to questions of moral values.238  Social, professional and 
 
 232. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 233. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 566-67 (criticizing Bowers’ characterization of 
the issue). 
 234. See, e.g., Michaelson, supra note 121 (arguing that changes in American 
culture in the fifteen years after Bowers undercut that case’s foundations). 
 235. See Araiza, supra note 19, at 554-55 (arguing that Congress is better suited 
for making judgments about whether a particular law is the result of “animus,” not 
the courts). 
 236. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 237. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (noting the belief 
of military professionals that a racially diverse officer corps is necessary to the 
success of the military’s mission); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noting the American 
Law Institute’s disapproval of laws criminalizing private consensual sexual 
conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting the views of 
professional and religious groups regarding the execution of the mentally 
retarded). 
 238. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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affiliational groups, by their statement and deed, can, respectively, 
express and demonstrate social and professional-group attitudes 
toward particular conduct or status.239  Corporate policies can 
reflect social attitudes, based on marketing strategies,240 
responsiveness to shareholder or employee pressure, or concerns 
for public image.241 
Thus, to the extent the meaning of domestic constitutional 
provisions turns in part on global understandings, the nature of the 
due process and equal protection guaranties points toward 
consideration not just of state practice, but of more general social 
judgments of a transnational or international nature.  This 
development dovetails with the ongoing evolution of international 
law away from a system limited to relations between sovereign 
states.242  The combination of this evolution of international law 
with American courts’ increased receptivity to international law in 
general holds much promise for litigators seeking a way to leverage 
into domestic constitutional doctrine human rights norms that are 
not simply foreign, or even international, but transnational in 
origin. 
D.  Gay Rights Claims and International Law 
Given the expanded understanding of international legal 
sources implied by the above analysis, gay rights litigants might be 
able to find significant international support for claims that 
domestic constitutional provisions protect gay rights claimants.  
With regard to actual international law norms—that is, treaty, 
customary, and jus cogens norms—European and United Nations 
judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on 
both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (noting the benefits corporations 
believe they receive from racially diverse workforces). 
 241. For example, pressure from employees, shareholders, and the public have 
all pushed corporations to consider improving, among other things, their 
environmental policies and the working conditions of their factories in the 
developing world.  See, e.g., David Barkin, The Social and Environmental Impacts of the 
Corporate Responsibility Movement in Mexico Since NAFTA, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 895 (2005) (examining “the issues and conflicts that emerged with the CRM 
as well as the manifestation of these issues in Mexico in the aftermath of NAFTA’s 
promulgation”). 
 242. See Spiro, supra note 80, at 2024 n.109 (noting that consent of states is not 
now the only way in which binding international law arises). 
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protection provisions in international texts.243  Additionally, a 
variety of United Nations bodies have declared sexual-orientation 
discrimination to be prohibited under various international 
agreements.244  Finally, a sizable and growing number of nations 
contain protections for gay and lesbian rights either in their 
constitutional text or doctrine or their statutory law.245  While these 
country-level protections are not themselves international law in 
the classic sense, and may not be sufficiently widespread to create a 
rule of customary international law,246 they would nevertheless help 
comprise the background social context for judicial interpretation 
of the due process and equal protection guaranties. 
Beyond this international and foreign law, evidence relevant to 
due process and equal protection claims can be found in the 
statements and conduct of transnational social groups.  As noted 
above, the same religious, professional, affiliational, and corporate 
groups whose actions and statements at the domestic level 
comprise the social judgments informing due process and 
(especially) equal protection law exist at a transnational level as 
well.247  The development of global community norms relevant to 
gay rights claims should be as relevant to American courts 
interpreting due process and equal protection claims as the 
development of analogous norms in the field of criminal 
punishment.  Indeed, Justice Scalia, surely no fan of international 
 
 243. See Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) (decision by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, construing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm; 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the 
European Court of Human Rights, construing the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), available at 
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1981/5.html; Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 186 (1991) (same); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993) 
(same); Mouta v. Portugal, 1 FCR 653 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999) (European Court of 
Human Rights decision finding national court’s custody decision based on 
applicant’s sexual orientation and same-sex co-habitation, to violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ prohibition on discrimination). 
 244. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151. 
245. See id.; see also James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and 
Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 246. See International Gay and Lesbian Ass’n, World Legal Survey (A listing of 
countries that prohibit same-sex conduct), available at http://www.ilga.info/ 
Information/Legal_survey/Summary%20information/countries_where_same_sex
_acts%20illegal.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 247. See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text. 
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opinion’s influence on constitutional doctrine, has criticized the 
idea that the Eighth Amendment possesses a distinctive character 
that makes recourse to foreign and international materials 
uniquely appropriate when interpreting it, citing recent due 
process and equal protection cases.248  If borrowing is appropriate 
in the Eighth Amendment context, it should be appropriate in 
these other areas as well.  Even assuming that Eighth Amendment 
borrowing is properly limited to the decisions of sovereigns—that 
is, either foreign law, treaty law, customary international law, or jus 
cogens249—such a limitation may not be as appropriate in due 
process and equal protection cases, where the relevant judgments 
are made at all levels of society, including both sovereigns and 
formal and informal social groups.250 
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a 
golden age for gay rights litigants.  Global opinion, even at the level 
of transnational organizations, as opposed to sovereign nations or 
formal international law, simply does not reflect an unambiguously 
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims.  Still, momentum 
for gay rights continues to build in advanced industrial 
democracies, both at the international,251 national,252 and 
transnational level.253  National and transnational progress is also 
 
 248. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1217, 1228 n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 249. But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting, as part of 
the consensus against the execution of mentally retarded inmates, the views of 
religious and professional organizations). 
 250. Compare, e.g., id. at 312 (relying on state legislative decisions as best 
indicators of consensus relating to Eighth Amendment issues), with Michaelson, 
supra note 121 (arguing that underlying changes in American society’s judgments 
regarding homosexuality undermined the foundation of Bowers v. Hardwick), and 
Araiza, supra note 19, at 554-55 (noting the fundamental role social judgments 
play in equal protection doctrine). 
 251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-74, 576-77 (2003) (noting 
decisions of the European Court of Justice, binding on all forty-five nations of the 
European Union); Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
164151, at *11-12 (noting European human rights legislation). 
 252. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *8-30; 
Wilets, supra note 245. 
 253. See, e.g., Frequent Flier.com, United Rolls Out New Partner Benefits, 
http://frequentflier.com/ffc-0805.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (noting United 
Airline’s plan eventually to offer domestic partner benefits to all employees 
worldwide); Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Work Life, 
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Search_the_Database&Template=/ 
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evident in westernized developing nations.254  Even if cultural 
barriers make it less likely that this momentum will easily translate 
into changes in other parts of the world, there is still reason to 
believe that a global consensus will continue to take shape in the 
coming years and decades.  As it does, an evolving domestic 
constitutional jurisprudence that views American social attitudes in 
a globalized context should be receptive to claims that such global 
opinion matters to domestic constitutional interpretation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As one commentator has written, “[a]lthough its doctrinal 
place remains unsettled, international law appears poised to make 
unprecedented inroads in the making of American constitutional 
law.”255  The same might be said of foreign law.  Several factors 
appear to be converging to make international and foreign law 
more prominent in domestic constitutional doctrine.  First, for 
several years justices of the Supreme Court have been moving 
toward more significant reliance on non-domestic law sources.256  
Second, the Court’s embrace in Lawrence of a more expansive due 
process jurisprudence, one that echoes Eighth Amendment 
doctrine in its willingness to consider non-domestic sources of law, 
makes those non-domestic sources more relevant to domestic 
constitutional interpretation. 
Because due process and, even more so, equal protection 
decisions rest on background social judgments, the type of non-
domestic law relevant to due process and equal protection 
decisions is more expansive than formal international law and 
foreign nation practice.  As transnational groups seek to influence 
American constitutional doctrine, both for its own sake and 
 
CustomSource/WorkNet/srch.cfm&searchtypeid=1&searchSubTypeID=1 (listing, 
among other entities that provide domestic partner benefits and have sexual 
orientation non-discrimination provisions, the International Monetary Fund, 
Greenpeace, and Human Rights Watch). 
 254. See, e.g., Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
164151, at *12-13 (citing law from South Africa and Colombia); id. at *28 (citing 
law from Fiji and Ecuador); id. at *29 (citing law from Costa Rica). 
 255. Spiro, supra note 80, at 2026. 
 256. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct 1183 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344, 348 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 
990, 995-98 (1999)  (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
53
Araiza: Foreign and International Law in Constitutional Gay Rights Litiga
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
01ARAIZA.DOC 1/20/2006  3:42:20 PM 
508 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
because of its worldwide persuasive value, they can be expected to 
present arguments to courts more frequently, drawing attention to 
whatever relevant global consensus exists on the issue at hand.  
This third development should provide American courts with both 
the information and the legal argumentation they have indicated 
they would welcome. 
Again, none of this is to suggest that American courts will 
jettison formal reliance on American constitutional provisions, in 
favor of deciding cases based on international norms.257  However, 
as consciousness of a global legal community recognizing certain 
rights grows, American courts will no doubt feel increased pressure 
to conform domestic doctrine to the contours of those rights, at 
least where American doctrine is neither self-consciously different 
than,258 nor inconsistent with,259 the global view.  In that way, 
American constitutional doctrine surely will become increasingly 
globalized.  This can only redound to the benefit of gay rights 
advocates, given that foreign nations, foreign opinion, and the 
world community as a whole have largely superseded the United 
States as leading protectors of the rights of gays and lesbians.260 
 
 257. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736-37 (2004) (expressing 
concern that recognition of a customary rule of law against arbitrary detention 
would, among other things, allow suits under the Alien Tort Statute to supplant 
claims under the Fourth Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). 
 258. See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1217, 1226-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing uniquely American jurisprudence relating to search and seizure and 
religious establishment rights). 
 259. In the case of the free speech, for example, American constitutional 
jurisprudence elevates the individual’s right to speak over other individuals’ rights 
to be free of insult or verbal oppression.  See, e.g., Kim Rappaport, In the Wake of 
Reno v. ACLU: The Continuing Struggle in Westernized Democracies with Internet 
Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 765, 768 (1998). 
 260. See, e.g., Heather Mason Kiefer, Public Opinion Favors Gay Rights in Britain, 
Canada, GALLOP POLL, May 24, 2005, http://poll.gallup.com/content 
/default.aspx?CI=16456 (indicating stronger support for gay rights in general and 
same-sex marriage in particular in Great Britain and Canada than in the United 
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